





Leonard Wood



L. P. ...
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Leonard Wood

Administrator, Soldier, and Citizen

By

William Herbert Hobbs

Professor in the University of Michigan, Member of the
Executive Committee of the National Security League,
Author of "The World War and Its Consequences," etc.

With an Introduction by
Henry A. Wise Wood

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*To the hundreds of thousands of brave men of the Allied Armies
Who gave their lives a needless sacrifice
Because the solemn warnings insistently sounded
By Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt were disregarded
by the American Government.*

FOREWORD

NO American who is solicitous of the future of his country can well avoid glancing at the map of the world with the question in mind: By what means have some nations achieved suzerainty over mankind, while others remain subordinate nations, whatever be the nominal degree of their independence?

Why are France, Great Britain, and the United States, powers of the first order? he will ask; why was Germany such a power, and why are Italy and Japan approaching this high estate? Then he will inquire why the prerogative of decision among all the world's nations recently gathered at Paris should have fallen into the hands of three nations, and eventually into the hands of two.

He will wish to know the nature of the qualities which enabled Germany almost to gain the mastery of Europe, which enabled France to endure Germany's attack, and which en-

abled the English-speaking peoples to overthrow the one, deliver the other, and to come forth with the control of the world in their hands.

These are deep questions, in the sense that they reach to the fundamental phenomena upon which the structure of organized society is reared. But they are not abstruse questions; they may be understood if one but grasp the truth that civilization rests upon the superiority of its military power, of its weapons and warlike prowess.

If this were not so, the great mass of mankind, which is composed of savage and barbarous races, would long since have overthrown the small groups of peoples who have collectively created modern society and who now enjoy its fruits, and who, despite their insignificance in numbers, are able to maintain and develop this society in the very midst of hostile multitudes. Were the military ramparts to fall by which this society is protected, there would instantly occur, not merely the sack of a Rome, but the destruction of civilization itself.

As Russia—and some of our own communities—have recently shown us, the savage and barbarous races are not confined to their native habitats, but their members are amongst us in great throngs, wearing our raiment and speaking our tongue. Some of them appear clad in the robes of our learning and culture, while simulating belief in our traditions and acquiescence in our governmental institutions; but they are nevertheless everywhere ready to throw over the established order so that they may possess themselves of its fruits without having to accept its, to them, alien and hateful restraints. One need only picture Western Europe, Great Britain, and our own continent, as having been plunged, as Russia has been plunged, into a condition of social and governmental disintegration, to realize whither a general barbaric eruption within the modern world would lead it.

So it is that civilization requires for its preservation the exercise of unsleeping vigilance, within its borders no less than beyond them. It must keep itself ready to defend promptly at its centre its traditions, and to

save itself from disintegrating revolution, set afoot by those not of Western blood whom it has cherished and taught, and by their native allies, while at its boundaries the barbarian must ever be confronted by invulnerable barriers.

Because military force still is, as it always has been, the bulwark of civilization, the greatest calamity that could befall the human race would be invited by the disarmament of its advanced peoples. So long as civilized man shall employ his knowledge, skill, and highly developed spiritual powers to create and wield armaments that are in complexity and might beyond the grasp of savage or barbarian, his conceptions of life will prevail. But, so soon as he shall cease to cultivate and himself control the mechanisms and art of warfare, then, that which he terms his social order will perish, and mankind will find itself once more at the foot of the ladder of intellectual growth, spiritual development, and liberty.

If we consider now the organized peoples that make up modern society, we find them in various stages of development. Some, being

unable to govern themselves, are wholly governed by their rulers, while others wholly govern themselves. Between the complete subject and the complete citizen, history attests, many generations, living under favorable conditions, must intervene. A nation of vassals can no more successfully become a nation of citizens, at a single step—as the experience of Russia proves—than can a nation of citizens successfully be made a nation of vassals. This should be borne in mind by those self-governing peoples who, like ourselves, thoughtlessly invite promiscuous immigration.

Social customs differ, those of some peoples being offensive to other peoples, while no two peoples place quite the same emphasis upon any precept of the moral law. As habits of thought and life, and material necessities, differ among peoples, so differ tenets of international morality, and, consequently, the reactions of nations when international questions arise. Some are fortunately, and others are unfortunately, situated with respect to the acquirement of wealth and power. Some are more

keenly alive than are others to the acquirement and use of practical knowledge. They differ in industrial energy and wisdom. Some peoples possess the local sense only, while others possess the world sense: hence the former expand but slowly, while the latter reach into the corners of the earth, found colonies everywhere, and take into their hands the direction of vast territories and the seas.

Between the two extremes are peoples in various stages of culture and growth, each dissatisfied with its lot and ever striving to better it by diplomacy or the sword. Thus, struggles for trade, for territorial or racial expansion, for security, with their ever present possibilities of war, are, and have always been, current phenomena in the international life of the civilized world.

We therefore come to see that there are three permanent dangers which menace the state, each of a military character, resulting from the hostility of (*a*) savage or barbaric peoples, (*b*) those within the state who wish to overthrow it, and (*c*) other, competitive, states.

In our search to discover the qualities which

will make of our own commonwealth an enduring republic we ask: What is it that has enabled the English-speaking peoples to achieve what is in effect the mastery of the world? Having learned the cause, we shall wish to apply it diligently in our affairs. I recently asked one, well grounded in history, to name the single most important factor in the emergence of the English-speaking peoples. "The unshakable self-confidence of the Anglo-Saxon," was the reply. Such is an effect, not a cause, but its suggestion furnishes an invaluable clue to the cause.

The self-confidence of the Anglo-Saxon is the stamp of his victories,—of the victories of the English-speaking peoples, whose affairs are conducted in accordance with Anglo-Saxon traditions and practices, notwithstanding their absorption of the blood of other peoples.

The Anglo-Saxon achieved victory over his rulers when he secured liberty of conscience and person, and when, throughout subsequent centuries of hardship, he perfected himself in the practice of self-government. He has achieved

victory over surrounding nature, from which he has wrung more useful secrets, and set them to work for man, than has all the world besides. He has achieved victory over the wild wastes and tribes of the earth, which his organizing skill has brought under cultivation and control. He has achieved victory over all the peoples that throughout nearly nine hundred years have come against him. And, as his greatest victory, he has spread the benign complexion of his social and governmental institutions over the social and governmental institutions of mankind.

But what are the characteristics that have enabled the so-called Anglo-Saxon to achieve these victories? The preservation of his group, and the cultivation of the traditional practices which have held it knit closely together and given it enduring form, have been to him the first duties of his being. To safeguard these, he has been ever ready to lay down his individual life. In response to an attack upon either, he has invariably chosen to suffer, rather than to yield. Having set upon his group and its institutions a higher value

than upon his individual life, he has been enduring in the midst of hardship, steadfast beneath the harrow of adverse circumstance, and fearless under the threat of death. In a world subject to volcanic national eruption, to meteoric national ascension and cataclysmic eclipse, the Anglo-Saxon has neither paused nor hurried, but has moved forward to mastery by the application of inexorable glacierlike pressure.

In all things he is practical. He comprehends the earth and the material realities of existence, and deals with each upon its own terms. He knows that if men would stand firmly they must set themselves squarely upon the ground; but he knows also that if they would control themselves and other men, they must cultivate their intellectual and spiritual qualities and make of these the inspirators of their conduct. In him, therefore, strength is tempered with kindness; firmness, with gentleness; justice, with mercy; conviction, with tolerance; controversy, with chivalry, and ambition, with thought for the welfare of mankind. In the Anglo-Saxon, the

materialist and idealist do not part company. Both, as he instinctively knows, are the artisans of nationality, and must be found functioning harmoniously in the daily life of a people if it is to endure and achieve greatly.

It is imperative that we have before us this view of the past; that we know and apply the qualities upon which our national life is based, as we enter the complex struggle for the preservation of our institutions into which we are now suddenly plunged. We have amongst us those who, hating the institutions of civilized society, would raze these, and others who, detesting national separatism, would destroy the jealous spirit of devoted love for group and country to which we owe all that we are as a race and a nation, and replace it with a dilute attachment for mankind in general and for no nation in particular.

The first represent the materialist from whom the idealist has parted company, while the second represent the idealist who has forsaken the materialist. Both will inevitably fail in their attempts violently to remodel the spiritual and material agencies by which we

have arrived where we are. But we must be prepared to pay the price of their defeat; we must be ready to suffer rather than to yield, if we are to avoid a calamitous transformation within, and preserve our form of government, or to avoid a disastrous surrender of our national liberty of action, and maintain our independence of foreign control.

The struggles in which we are now engaged are but a continuation of the series of events with which this book deals. In all of these events the same forces are to be seen more or less in co-operation, the one striving to destroy the national spirit, in order to bring about a revolution with safety and profit to itself; the other seeking to betray it, in order to bring all peoples into, or under the control of, a single international body. Patriotism is in the sight of both an offensive attribute which, because it stands in the way of both, is attacked by them in common. Thus we find the gross forces of revolution in virtual alliance with the cultivated forces of ultra idealism, which explains the philosophy of those who, while leading the

second, tolerate and condone the offences of the first.

The recent Preparedness movement was the natural expression of the reaction of patriotic men of strong nationalistic feeling against the non-patriotic, internationalistic philosophy of President Wilson. That this movement was able at last to overturn his purpose, and to precipitate him into a war that was repugnant to him, is not cause for surprise; but that so great an effort was needed to arouse an English-speaking commonwealth to perform the patriotic duty of defending its nationality, is cause not alone for surprise, but for concern,—concern which is intensified by the herculean efforts now being required of another patriotic group, in the pending contest over the terms upon which we shall join a league of nations, to prevent the same community from yielding up its independence and surrendering the control of its destiny into the hands of a group of alien peoples.

In the various phases of the struggle for the preservation of traditional personal and national rights, which began with the Prepared-

ness movement, there have stood forth two antithetic types of man. The one, the demolisher and reconstructionist who, whether as pacifist or covenanter, would first demolish and then abruptly remould the institutions of his people, upon an arbitrary plan of his own devising, and toss his nation into the melting pot of internationalism; the other, the conservator, the patriot committed to the conservation of his institutions and their orderly development, and the preservation of his nation's independence, who believes in the painstaking creation of a condition of international harmony based upon justice and mutual accommodation, but not upon the pooling of sovereignties.

Between these types no reconciliation is possible, nor is compromise possible between the theories of life and government which they profess. The first neither likes nor trusts either the processes by which Anglo-Saxon civilization has been achieved, or their resulting institutions; the second is the very product of these processes, and his free institutions are the breath of his nostrils. The

one is exotic; the other is native. The one reacted to the war and the peace in ways wholly unknown to the history of English-speaking peoples; the other reacted to both in normal Anglo-Saxon fashion.

The story told by Professor Hobbs in his *World War and Its Consequences*, and in this book, is the story of the struggle between an alien parasitic growth, and the sturdy native tree about which it is stealthily entwining its tendrils. It is the story of the stout resistance of the Anglo-Saxon spirit to strangulation by ostensibly native fingers through the veins of which runs hostile alien blood. Twice has the man of this book stood forth as the defending instrument of that spirit; at Plattsburg, while there gathered the clouds of war, and at Omaha and Gary, after the clouds had broken and gone. In both crises the native spirit was personified in Leonard Wood, and in both it prevailed. Did this soldier and administrator not possess in extraordinary degree the wise and virile qualities which have brought about and preserve the ascendancy of our great, our dominant race, he could not have aroused his

countrymen from the somnolence of a spiritual drugging by the administrative head of their government and set them to prepare for their hour of trial, nor could he have stilled the revolutionary mob at Gary, without the loss of a life.

Of his historian, also, something is to be said. In these days of an idealism unrelated to the facts of life, when the word *patriotism* must be spoken apologetically, if at all, in many halls of learning, and when the charter of our liberties is often the stock subject of academic jest, it is an occurrence of no small importance when one meets suddenly, face to face, a scholar who is a patriot. Such a man is the author of this book. Beneath the superstructure of his erudition, there lies an Americanism so profound and strong as to make him proof against the blasts of destructive ephemeral thoughts which, sweeping hither and thither across the intellectual world, press for a moment and are gone,—before the impact of such only a great man stays always rooted.

HENRY A. WISE WOOD.

NEW YORK CITY,
October 27, 1919.

PREFACE

THIS book makes no pretence either to deal adequately with the life of a great American, or with the important Preparedness movement of which he has been the conspicuous leader. These will no doubt be the subjects of careful study and of extended treatment by competent historians in the near future. The writer has found it a congenial task to devote a portion of his vacation to putting the salient facts in order. The book has almost written itself, for the attempt has been, so far as possible, to substitute for his own words the statements of those who by reason of their direct relation to the events recorded speak with the greatest authority.

W. H. H.

ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN,
September 1, 1919.

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LEONARD WOOD

Part I

The Soldier and Administrator

INTRODUCTION

THE historian of the future will be compelled to study as one of the dominating factors in the World War that bitter struggle of the advocates of national defence against the hosts of pacifism, the later phases of which struggle have become known in the United States as the Preparedness movement. A competent judge has said, "Nothing of the kind, and certainly nothing of equal extent, has been known in this or in any other country." The main object of the preparedness men, which was to provide for their country an adequate national defence before its involvement in war, was not to be crowned with success; but the salutary effect of the movement upon the morale of the nation through education to meet responsibilities when the storm should break, has been nothing less than overwhelming and was a prime factor in the final triumph of the Allies.

If it is true, as is now generally admitted, that America's participation was necessary for the winning of the war, it follows that the eleven months of indecision and note-writing which followed the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and the additional seventeen months which separated our official entry upon our responsibilities from our effective participation—two and one third years in all—cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of brave men in the Allied armies, an amount of treasure which can scarcely be computed, and perhaps most important of all, it brought about that slow disintegration of morale within the Allied countries which is the direct consequence of exhaustion and discouragement and manifests itself by the running amuck of the disorderly elements of the proletariat. These new horrors, while bearing most heavily upon our Allies who have borne the burden and heat of the conflict, are now menacing the peace and prosperity of the entire world; and it is clear that they might all have been avoided.

The unfortunate discussion which has now developed over the question which nation won

the war—a discussion entirely futile since all were necessary—has thus far overlooked the vitally important antecedent question of which nation lost the war for the Allies during the first two and a half years of the struggle. It is as true of support of war effort as of the military campaigns that morale is three fourths, and actual physical effort one fourth; and it would be easy to show that President Wilson's deadening repression of every patriotic sentiment, and his eagerness to launch one peace without victory movement after another, again and again blocked the military efforts of the Allied Powers. The complete breakdown of the Allies' Balkan policy must be studied with this in mind, as must also the long delay of Great Britain to take the strangle hold and vigorously enforce a blockade against the enemy. This delay was occasioned largely through fear of giving offence to the American Government, and to it is to be charged therefore the great military successes of Germany during the opening years of the war. Throughout this period the President was addressing to the British Government

vigorous notes of protest against the restrictions which were put upon American trade, meanwhile negotiating with the Berlin Government in an effort to abolish all blockade and set up the German doctrine of Freedom of the Seas. Had the British Government but felt free to enforce the blockade in the years 1914 and 1915, as it did later, the great crisis of 1917 which resulted from submarine successes, and the military crisis of the spring of 1918, could hardly have occurred. Had we in America through preparedness in season been able to apply our military force in six months, instead of seventeen months, after our admission that we were at war, the end must have come in the defeat of Germany at least a full year before the date of the signing of the armistice.

The American Preparedness movement and the British had many points in common. Entrusting its defence to a dominant navy, the British Government had adopted the policy of maintaining no army of importance at home; but the very obvious menace which was rearing its head in Germany had within the last dec-

ade before the war given the alarm to a few far-seeing statesmen and military men. Seven years before the war broke, that great British soldier, Field Marshal Earl Roberts, the hero of Kabul and Kandahar, threw age-long military traditions to the winds and travelled up and down the land sounding the warning to "prepare or perish." His warnings were resented by the pacifist ministry then in power, and were apparently but little heeded by the common people. The Minister of State for War administered a rebuke which was accompanied by a threat to take away the Field Marshal's pension if he did not desist from his crusade. For such an unusual departure from age-long tradition as that made by Earl Roberts, though one which time has fully justified, a courage was required far greater than that which leads men to face the cannon in battle.

This fearless course of Lord Roberts in England was paralleled in the United States by that of General Leonard Wood, who was likewise the ranking general in the army and the most distinguished soldier in the coun-

try. Both these great commanders had been at the German manoeuvres of 1902, where they watched the rehearsal in practice of the most perfect military machine that the world had ever seen. "Wood," said Roberts, "what are our countries to do when that splendid military machine is directed against us?" Each returned to warn his country at whatever cost to himself. In each case the warning was unheeded and bitterly resented by the pacifist Government in power.

Soldier as he is, General Wood has kept his temper and, no matter under what provocation, he has never been led into criticism of his Commander-in-Chief; but neither has he been coerced by threats or intimidation from telling the stark truth concerning the peril that has faced his country. No one not himself a commander of troops is likely in any degree to be able to measure the depths of the General's heart-breaking disappointment when upon the eve of embarking for the front with the crack division which he had trained, the order was received relieving him of his command and aiming to place him on the shelf at



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General and Mrs. Wood and family

a deserted military post. At this juncture public opinion became audible in so angry a tone that the order had to be modified and the General permitted to exercise his genius in training a second division for field service. This second splendid unit was trained and ready to leave for the front when hostilities were terminated by the signing of the armistice.

The proponents of preparedness have always made their fight under most serious handicaps. It is peculiar to humanity to accept of two programmes that one which is the more agreeable. Our wishes are almost inevitably the father to our thoughts and beliefs. The siren voice of pacifism tells us that we are secure in a soft and easy existence with leisure for high thinking and for boundless material prosperity. Why should we resort to stern self-sacrifice and turn our thoughts even for a moment to such base objects as preparing to destroy the lives of our fellow-men made in the image of God? "It is wicked"; they say, "it is the militarism of a sordid Europe above which we have risen in our famed American

idealism"; and a picture is painted of a future Utopia of which no evidence has yet been seen.

If, in addition, the Government is actively engaged in developing the propaganda of pacifism, it becomes invested with the prestige of legality, and Americans are a law-abiding people who expect to follow the lead of their Government in all things. No one who has studied carefully the situation, or who has read with any fullness the press comments during the days of suspense which followed the sinking of the *Lusitania*, can doubt that if, instead of his "too proud to fight" address, President Wilson had spoken a word of courage and determination, the vast majority of his countrymen would have rallied loyally behind him in a declaration of war upon Germany.

No less important as a factor in the great struggle to raise the public morale has been that mass psychology of the people which is developed by mass action through association, and which responds to stimulation—organization. Once a stand has been taken, the pride

of consistency and firmness is impelling against any change of mental attitude. Hence the side which first occupies the field with propaganda is, quite independent of the strength of its arguments (provided counter arguments are not forthcoming), almost certain to prevail because of the mind becoming committed and so closed to argument. The organized peace societies were first in the field, and they were, moreover, far better financed throughout than were the defence organizations which so tardily followed them. Moreover, such appeal to the emotions as they indulged in lent itself readily to popular oratory, against which the appeal to reason of sober statements can hardly be expected to prevail if abundant time for deliberation is not found.

It was the impelling object-lessons of the war itself during those years when we were shielded by the Allies, confirming as they did the arguments of the preparedness men and refuting the shallow prattlings of the pacifist preachments, which wrought those profound changes in the national morale which now appear so remarkable. In inculcating these

fundamental truths, the names that stand out above all others are those of Leonard Wood, the American Lord Roberts, and of Theodore Roosevelt, the vocalized conscience of the American people. Associated in the command of the rough riders during the Spanish-American War, their close friendship was like that of David and Jonathan. Cut down in the midst of the crisis which had supervened after the signing of the armistice, a crisis hardly secondary to that of the war itself, the mantle of Roosevelt seems to have fallen upon Wood, hampered though he is by his high position in the army from entire freedom of utterance.

The dangers of wrong-headed leadership are the same to-day as they were in 1914. The issue is pacifism and internationalism as opposed to national preparedness and full Americanism. If time can be found for full deliberation upon the Utopian proposals of the pacifist set forth with so much noisy propaganda, the sound sense of the nation may be relied upon to assert itself in their repudiation; for Americanism has from the beginning of

our history been a dominant national trait, and throughout history nationalism has always been immensely stimulated by triumphs in foreign wars.

CHAPTER I

AN AMERICAN SOLDIER

A characteristic incident—Wood's early life—He enters the army as a contract surgeon—He takes part in Lawton's expedition against Geronimo—Takes command of the infantry when no line officers are left—Is given the Congressional Medal of Honor—Ordered to Washington to become attending surgeon to President Cleveland—Meets Theodore Roosevelt—Wood organizes the "Rough Riders" and becomes Colonel of Volunteers—The battle of Las Guasimas—Commands a brigade at battle of San Juan Hill—Becomes Governor of Santiago Province—Cleaning a pest-ridden city—The regeneration of a province—With one sentry the General suppresses a riot.

WHEN General Wood held the post of Chief of Staff of the United States Army, the highest position in the service, it is reported that a lanky Western fellow whose gait proclaimed that he had spent his life in the saddle wandered into the War Department.

"Who was that bull-bison who dashed past me and bolted through that door as if it hadn't any business bein' in the way?" he inquired.

"That was General Wood," solemnly replied the doorkeeper.

"He covers the ground mighty decided," remarked the saddle man. "Wonder if he's any relative of Doc Wood—Doc Len Wood, who used to be with the Fourth Cavalry in Arizona, and went with the Rough Riders to Cuba, and afterward President McKinley made him Governor."

"That was the General Wood himself," replied the doorkeeper.

"You're guyin' me," said the Westerner. "Maybe you think I don't know Len Wood. Waal, I do then. I served in the Fourth Cavalry through the Geronimo campaign when Wood got his breakin' in—a lean, clean-cut, yellow-white-headed contract doctor; but he made a go of it, by gosh! He wasn't much to look at, but we soon caught on that what little stuffin' there was in him was all right, and before he was with us long, there wasn't a man could best him. Doc was always right on hand whenever there was a man to be pulled through. We come to think a powerful lot of Len Wood, back there in '86. You

never could get talk enough out of him to call it answerin' back, but whenever it was *doin'* instead of *talkin'*, he was front, rear, and both flanks. He had an eye in his head that you didn't want to have hit you if you wasn't satisfied to have it see clean through." He paused abruptly and settled back against the wall, for the door flew open and General Wood emerged, tall, massive, with deep chest and powerful shoulders, and quick and elastic in every motion.

As he passed the old soldier the General stopped and extending his hand said quietly, "Hello, Bill, what brings you here?"

And the writer in the *Independent* who has put the incident on record adds truly, "It was characteristic of the man. He is cordial, democratic, and as charming as a man as he is energetic as a soldier." The incident shows, what is confirmed by pictures, that the powerful physique of the General, that makes him conspicuous in any assembly, has been largely developed while he has been making his career.

Though born in 1860 at Winchester, New Hampshire, Leonard Wood grew up at Pocas-



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Leonard Wood in 1885

set on Cape Cod, a little village only about fifteen miles from Plymouth Rock, where his ancestors had landed in 1620. The boy grew up with all the Cape Codder's love of the sea, and his early ambition was to enter the United States Navy. He became expert in the handling of small boats and loved most of all to sail his light craft in stormy weather.

Wood's father, a veteran of the Civil War, was a country doctor of small means, and with the aid of a hard-earned scholarship the boy made his way through college by tutoring those students who were more favored than he in this world's goods. In 1884 he received his diploma from the Harvard University Medical School as Doctor of Medicine. After a year and a half of practice as interne in the Boston City Hospital, and eight months' practice in the city, he succumbed to the strong impulse to get into the service of his country and took examinations for the position of army surgeon.

Wood passed second in the examination in a class of fifty-nine, and there being no vacancy at the time available, he gladly volunteered

for the position of contract surgeon with the expedition under Captain H. W. Lawton which was just then starting out to capture hostile Apaches under the notorious chief Geronimo. It was this Captain Lawton who rose from the ranks to be Major General in the Regular Army, and who was later killed in the Philippine campaign greatly beloved throughout the service.

Lawton's expedition against Geronimo crossed the border into the provinces of Sonora and Chihuahua in Old Mexico, and, in following the wily Geronimo and his band until all were either captured or had surrendered, the command travelled in all more than two thousand miles over broken and generally desert country. The region is a volcanic plateau with ranges of broken mountains separated by cañons and almost devoid of water. The heat was so intense that the hands could not be held against the surface of the rocks or upon the metal parts of the rifles. This Mexican wilderness so new to the troopers had been gone over almost inch by inch by the Apaches, who could moreover support life

on roots, mice and rats, whereas the soldiers' provisions had to be brought in on pack animals. The party consisted of fifty soldiers and twenty Indian scouts with officers, but the majority in the command were used up and left behind long before the chase had ended. Lawton and Wood were the only officers who went through the entire campaign, and after the infantry had been left without any line officers, Wood was at his own request given the command in addition to performing his duties as surgeon. On one occasion he travelled one hundred and thirty-six miles in thirty-six hours, half of it on foot and half on horseback. He walked with the scouts all day, rode seventy miles with dispatches the following night, and next morning took his place with the marching column.

During his services in this, his initial campaign, Wood was made first lieutenant and assistant surgeon in the Regular Army, and for distinguished gallantry in service was awarded by Congress the coveted Medal of Honor, the American equivalent of the British Victoria Cross. Five years later (January 6,

1891) he was commissioned a captain. In a report to General Miles, Captain Lawton wrote in 1894:

“Concerning Dr. Leonard Wood, I can only repeat what I have before reported officially, and what I have said to you; that his services during that trying campaign were of the highest order. I speak particularly of services other than those devolving upon him as a medical officer; services as a combat or line officer, voluntarily performed. He sought the most difficult and dangerous work, and by his determination and courage rendered a successful issue in the campaign possible.”

Later, in a letter to the Governor of Massachusetts, Lawton wrote:

“I served through the War of the Rebellion, and in many battles, but in no instance do I remember such devotion to duty or such an example of courage and perseverance. It was mainly due to Captain Wood’s

loyalty and resolution that the expedition was successful. He will be a credit to his State in any capacity of soldierly duty."

In endorsing Colonel Lawton's recommendation of Captain Wood, General Miles, commanding the department, wrote:

"I now most earnestly renew the recommendation, calling especial attention to the letter of Colonel Lawton, which describes one of the most laborious, persistent, and heroic campaigns in which men were ever engaged and the fact that Captain Leonard Wood, Assistant Surgeon, volunteered to perform the extraordinarily hazardous and dangerous service is creditable to him in the highest degree. For his gallantry on the 13th of July in the surprise and capture of Geronimo's camp, I recommend he be brevetted for his services on that date."

Captain Wood remained for some years with the army in the Southwest, taking part in other

stirring frontier work, which included a dash after the "Apache Kid" and a heliographic survey of sections of Arizona. He was then ordered to Washington, where he became the attending surgeon at the White House during Cleveland's and a portion of McKinley's administration. Here he was in close confidential relations with two presidents and had quite unusual opportunities to learn something of national politics and of the duties and responsibilities of the Chief Executive. It was in his capacity as surgeon to the President that two years before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War Wood first met Theodore Roosevelt at a dinner in Washington, and at once entered upon that close personal friendship which profoundly affected the lives of both these strenuous Americans. This close association of two strong men, fraught as it was with so much of good to their country, is unique in the nation's history. Both men saw clearly the impending conflict with Spain, and both planned to bear a part in the war. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt was able to bring about those essential reforms

which, taken in time, had so much to do with our success when the trial came.

Unprepared on the military side, as the country was when the war broke, Senator Warren of Montana better than most men at the Capitol knew the great West and the importance of utilizing its men hardened to outdoor life. He was able to secure from Congress the authorization for the raising of three regiments of volunteer cavalry. The first of these, and the only one which saw service in Cuba was organized by Wood with Roosevelt's assistance and became known as the "Rough Riders." The splendid record of this unit is such recent history and so well known as to need no repetition here. What is less familiar is the remarkable way in which the regiment was organized, equipped, brought to the port of debarkation, embarked and landed in Cuba, and put through two offensive battles—all within sixty days. This was a work of genius which depended upon Wood's knowing in advance where the necessary articles of equipment were to be found, how to substitute for them when they were not available, as well as

upon his tireless energy, although it also depended in no small measure upon his personal friendship with the Secretary of War which permitted him to cut the endless red tape which hampered all our movements.

It is a common error to suppose that Wood was greatly favored by fortune in his appointment to the command of the regiment. As a matter of fact, he had for years been studying in preparation for line duty. It was because of strong recommendations made by such fighting generals as Lawton, Forsythe, Graham, and others of the regular service that Secretary Alger gave him the commission.

In the earlier of the two actions in which the regiment fought, the battle of Las Guasimas, General S. B. M. Young commanded the Second Cavalry Brigade which included the Rough Riders. In his report General Young said:

“I cannot speak too highly of the efficient manner in which Colonel Wood handled his regiment and of his magnificent behavior on the field. . . . Both Colonel Wood and



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General Wheeler, General Wood, and Colonel Roosevelt in Cuba

Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt disdained to take advantage of shelter or cover from the enemy's fire while any of their men remained exposed to it—an error of judgment, but happily on the heroic side.”

Before the later and more general fighting about San Juan hill, which ended in the surrender of Santiago, General Young was stricken down with fever, and as a consequence Wood was placed in command of the Cavalry Brigade, Roosevelt succeeding to the command of the Rough Riders. The division commander, General Joe Wheeler, in his report of the battle said, “Too much credit cannot be given to the gallant brigade commanders, General Wood, etc.” The corps commander reported: “The following officers were conspicuous for their bravery and handled their troops so well I desire to recommend them for promotion: . . . Colonel Wood to be brigadier general, etc.” Later he reported, “I think General Wood by far the best man to leave in command of the city of Santiago, and perhaps of the whole district.”

The command of the city and province of Santiago brought in a few months the advance in rank to Major General of Volunteers in recognition of his exceptional service there. The story of how General Wood cleaned up Santiago is one that Americans are justly proud of, for it shows what American energy when combined with genius for administration can accomplish even under the most discouraging conditions. Before the Spaniards had been besieged in this city of more than forty thousand inhabitants, it had been notorious as a plague spot. It had been said of it by an old merchant captain that "it could be smelt ten miles at sea."

When General Wood was first placed in charge, the city had been under siege with a considerable Spanish army in occupation. Bodies of the dead lay in the streets with vultures feasting on the carrion. The inhabitants were starving, and women stretched gaunt arms from the windows begging for food. Little naked children, their distended abdomens telling of the famine, crawled under the legs of the horses and appealed for crusts.

A British writer who was an eye-witness said in the *Nineteenth Century* :

“If ever in this world the extraordinary man, the man of destiny, the man of pre-eminent powers and resource, was needed, it was in Santiago de Cuba during the latter part of July, 1898. The occasion demanded first a physician to deal with the tremendous sanitary needs; then a soldier, to suppress turbulence and effect a quick restoration of law and order; and, finally, a statesman, to re-establish and perfect a Civil Government. In General Wood was found a man who, by nature, education, and experience, combined in himself a generous share of the special skill of all these three. By special education and subsequent practice he was a physician; by practice and incidental education, added to a natural bent, he was a soldier and a law-giver.”

After four months of American rule, the people had been rescued from starvation, one of the foulest cities on earth had been trans-

formed into one of the cleanest, the average daily death rate had been reduced from two hundred to ten, street and road improvement was proceeding apace, enormous reductions of expenses had taken place, the prisons had been cleared of persons held for trivial offences without trial, and had been in addition thoroughly cleaned, courts had been reformed, the press made free, business had recovered and was full of confidence.

The British observer who has already been quoted says:

“This unparalleled regeneration had been wrought, not by a host of men native to the locality, and occupying offices long established, and enjoying an official prestige, but by an American Brigadier General of Volunteers, a stranger to the place and the people, embarked in the work on a moment’s notice, and having for his immediate aids only a few fellow army officers, some of whom had been out of West Point less than two years, and all of whom were as new to the situation as himself. It was the *tour*

de force of a man of genius; for in the harder, more fundamental of the tasks that confronted him here General Wood had no previous experience."

The General himself penetrated into the noisome places where pestilence hovered, and his officers and men took their cue from the Chief. He came in touch with all classes of the population and daily sat in judgment on trivial as well as more serious cases until a proper system of courts was set up and able to dispense judgment. Taken down with the *Calentura*, or Cuban fever, a report came in of a bloody riot in which the newly established rural police and a body of negro soldiers had been involved. He was up at once and spent hours at the telephone conducting the investigation, and the next day he journeyed by train to the scene of the trouble to pursue his examination further.

Feeling between the Cubans and the Spaniards who had so recently been their tyrannical masters was naturally most bitter on the island. One evening a mob of several

hundred Cubans stormed the Spanish Club on the *Plaza de Armas*, using bricks and stones. The General was working late in his office in the palace across the Plaza with a single sentry on duty. A man rushed up with the cry, "Where's the General, quick?" Before the sentry could report, the General had come out carrying his riding whip and replied, "I have heard the row. We will go over and stop it." Crossing the square with the one American soldier, the General said quietly, "Just shove them back, sentry." The soldier swung his rifle and the way was cleared in front of the door, after which the General gave the order, "Now shoot the first man who places his foot upon that step," and went back to his office. The report upon this incident says, "Within an hour the mob had dispersed, subdued by two men, one rifle, and a riding whip. And the lesson is still kept in good memory."

General Wood paid for his fearlessness in going about in fever-infested portions of the city by being struck down by yellow fever in 1898. When in the spring of 1899 he left Santiago for a brief visit to the United States,

the people of the city presented him with a testimonial engrossed in Spanish which translated reads in part:

“The people of the City of Santiago de Cuba to General Leonard Wood . . . the greatest of all your successes is to have won the confidence and the esteem of a people in trouble.”

CHAPTER II

THE BUILDER OF REPUBLICS

Military Governor of Cuba—Gains good-will of the Catholic Church—Wood's modest summary of his work—The scourge of yellow fever—The fever eradicated—A Cuban republic set up—Secretary Root's appraisal of Wood—The Rathbone charges—Appointed civil governor of Moro Province in the Philippines—His studies en route—The prejudice against him in the army—Studying the Moros upon the ground—War with the Datu Ali—Fierce battle in a volcanic crater—A congressional inquiry—Changed feeling in the army—Made grand officer of the Legion of Honor.

THE remarkable success which had been achieved by General Wood as Governor of the Province of Santiago led to his appointment as Military Governor of Cuba, in which office, as a result of centuries of misrule, vast problems of reform had to be taken up and solved. None of these were more delicate for a Protestant Governor to handle than the questions concerning the Catholic Church, which was established here in power as it was in every other Spanish colony. It is a tribute

no less to the firmness than to the tact of the Governor that when he was stricken down with typhoid fever, the Bishop of Havana led the people of the island in solicitous interest and had prayers offered in the churches throughout the island for his recovery.

General Wood was Military Governor of Cuba from December 12, 1899, until the transfer of the government to the Cuban Republic on May 20, 1902. His own modest summary of the transformations which had been wrought during this period has been published in volume xxi. of the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, from which article the following paragraphs have been taken:

“Conditions in Santiago at the time of occupancy were as unfavorable as can be imagined. Yellow fever, pernicious malaria, and intestinal fevers were all prevalent to an alarming extent. The city and surrounding country was full of sick Spanish soldiers, starving Cubans, and the sick of our army. The sanitary conditions were

indescribably bad. There was little or no water available and the conditions were such as can be imagined to exist in a tropical city following a siege and capture in the most unhealthy season of the year. . . .

“In October the Spanish garrison, consisting of some twelve thousand men, was withdrawn from the northwestern portion of the Province. Upon their withdrawal it was found that smallpox was epidemic in most of the towns that had been occupied and an investigation showed that there were approximately three thousand cases of smallpox existing in the Holguin district and that the disease was of the malignant type. . . . The efforts taken were effective in bringing the disease to a summary conclusion, and since this epidemic Cuba has been free from smallpox. . . .

“With the stamping out of this epidemic, the worst features of the sanitary situation were removed, and affairs began to have a more hopeful outlook. . . .

“Conditions were encountered in Havana similar to those in Santiago, but not so

severe, as the city had not undergone a siege. . . .”

Of the remarkable work of the commission which Wood organized under Dr. Walter Reed with a view to the solution of the problem of transmission of yellow fever and the phenomenal success which was achieved, the General says:

“The work of the commission, of which Dr. Reed was the President and directing spirit, is of the greatest importance to humanity at large. No medical discovery of equal importance has been made since the days of vaccination; and, as time goes on, the immense value of the work done, principally by this officer and his incidental associates, will receive that degree of appreciation and recognition which it so justly deserves.”

Summarizing his report he says:

“The Government was transferred as a going concern. All the public offices were

filled with competent, well-trained employees; the island was free from debt and had a surplus of a million and a half dollars in the treasury; was possessed of a thoroughly trained and efficient personnel in all departments; completely equipped buildings for the transaction of public business; the administration of justice was free; habeas corpus had been put in force, police courts had been established; a new marriage law on lines proposed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Havana, giving equal rights to all denominations, was in operation; the people were governed, in all municipalities, by officials of their own choice elected at the polls; trials in Cuban courts were as prompt as in any State of the Union, and life and property were absolutely safe; sanitary conditions were better than those existing in most parts of the United States; yellow fever had been eradicated from the island; modern systems of public education, including a university, high school, and nearly three thousand seven hundred public schools had been established; also well-



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General Wood in 1916

organized departments of charities and public works. The island was well supplied with hospitals and asylums; beggars were almost unknown. A new railroad law had been promulgated; custom houses had been equipped and thoroughly established; the great question of church property had been settled; . . . public order was excellent; the island possessed a highly organized and efficient rural guard; an enormous amount of public works had been undertaken and completed; harbors and channels were buoyed; old lighthouses had been thoroughly renovated and new ones built; in short, the Government as transferred was in excellent running order. . . . The insular government was undertaken without a dollar of public money on hand, except the daily collection of customs and internal revenue, and involved the collection and disbursement of \$57,197,140.80, during its existence for improvement in material conditions and the upbuilding of insular institutions. This sum does not include the

municipal revenue, only the general insular revenues.

“The work called for and accomplished was the building up of a REPUBLIC, in a country 70 per cent. of the people of which were illiterate; where they had lived always as a military colony; where general elections as we understand them were unknown; in fact, it was a work which called for practically a rewriting of the administrative law of the land; . . . in short, the establishment, in a little over three years, in a Latin military colony, in one of the most unhealthy countries of the world, of a republic modelled closely upon the lines of our own great Anglo-Saxon Republic; and the transfer to the Cuban people of the republic so established, free from debt, healthy, orderly, well-equipped, and with a good balance in the treasury. All of this work was accomplished without serious friction. The island of Cuba was transferred to its people as promised, and was started on its career in good condition and under the most favorable circumstances.”

Of what this accomplishment by a young Major General of Volunteers with little experience to guide him really signified, Elihu Root, then the Secretary of War under whose jurisdiction was the Insular Government, had this to say:

“Out of an utterly prostrate colony a free republic was built up, the work being done with such signal ability, integrity, and success that the new nation started under more favorable conditions than has ever before been the case in any single instance among her fellow Spanish-American republics. This record stands alone in history, and the benefit conferred thereby on the people of Cuba was no greater than the honor conferred upon the people of the United States.”

Lord Cromer, Great Britain's greatest colonial administrator and the maker of modern Egypt, is reported to have said of Leonard Wood's work in Cuba that it was “the greatest piece of colonial administration in all history.”

It is further reported of him that when asked to name the best person to succeed him in his difficult task, the Earl replied that the best man was not available since he was an American citizen.

It will hardly be supposed that this phenomenal transformation of a Spanish colony could have been accomplished without the making of powerful enemies. E. G. Rathbone, the Cuban Director General of Posts, a friend and favorite of Mark Hanna, was convicted and sent to prison because of the extensive frauds which the Governor had uncovered in the postal department. Later, when Wood was nominated for Major General in the Regular Army, serious charges were preferred against him by Rathbone, among them being favoritism, bribery, libel, and confusion of his accounts. The matters referred to in these charges were fully aired in an investigation by a committee of Congress and found to be without foundation.

A year after his return from Cuba General Wood was entrusted by President Roosevelt with the difficult task of pacifying and intro-

ducing civil government in the Moro Province of the Philippine Islands—comprising the greater part of the southern island of Mindanao and the islands of the Sulu group—a province inhabited throughout by slave-holding Mohammedans and governed by Moro Sultans, Panglimas, Datus, etc. The Spaniards when in control of the islands had been unable to subdue this province and had left there a state of lawlessness and disorder which bordered on chaos. The natives belonged to twenty different tribes scattered throughout a vast tropical wilderness devoid of roads and penetrated only for short distances from the coast. In explanation of our lack of success in pacifying the island the excuse had been advanced that the time was not yet ripe. As a matter of fact, the country was waiting for the right man.

The manner of determining Wood's appointment to this difficult post is not without interest. President Roosevelt had been fencing with Wood in the White House library, and during a brief rest he remarked, "I have been wondering whom I could send to the

Philippines. There is some rough and important work to be done out there." "Why not send me?" asked Wood. "Bully," responded the strenuous President. "Go over and see Root about it to-night."

Not only was it characteristic of Wood to volunteer for arduous and difficult service, but it was equally like him to study the subject in advance from every possible angle. On his way out to the islands he paid a visit to Earl Cromer, the man who had made modern Egypt, and not only gave personal examination while en route to the methods employed in India, Ceylon, Java, the Straits Settlements, and in every native colony where colonial problems had been solved; but he also collected a large library of colonial literature from which also he extracted the lessons taught by experience.

It was only natural that an officer in the United States Army who was not a graduate of the Military Academy, who had been on intimate terms of association with three Presidents in succession, and who had made so sensational a rise, should be looked upon with

suspicion and envy by many officers of the army and particularly by those who had been longer in the service. To a large extent these feelings disappeared when Wood was found to outmarch, outfight, and out-endure the hardest veteran in his command.

Satisfied that he had absorbed what it was possible for him to learn from books dealing with the colonial government of backward peoples, Wood determined to continue the study upon the ground and said to his staff, "We have got to learn this country and the people from personal acquaintance and observation." He at once left Manila and sailed for Zamboanga in Mindanao, where after unpacking his horse equipment only, he plunged into the jungle and disappeared for a month.

On this, his first tour of the islands, the General met every native chief of importance, inspected all military posts and stations, and for a talk with the Governor there he paid a flying trip to the neighboring island of Borneo, where conditions were in some respects similar. This completed, he was ready to lay his plans for the future government of the island.

He met the Moros half way by incorporating into the government plan some of the old tribal customs which were not particularly harmful, but slavery and slave-dealing he determined to abolish. This decision brought on war with the great Datu Ali and other chiefs, who fortified themselves and defied the new government to release the slaves. The campaign that drove Ali out of his fort was the last of a series of expeditions against the Sulu Moros, and was led by the General himself, and the troops followed the rebel until he was slain and his followers had surrendered their guns.

One of the insurrections occurred among the fanatical and hitherto unconquered Taracas of Lake Lanao. The expedition against these robber natives which broke their power ended in a battle in the crater of the volcano Dajo. General Wood went on foot with the soldiers over mountains and through tropical jungles faring exactly as they did. He accompanied the assaulting column, though leaving to the commanding officer both the direction of and full credit for the victory. In this

assault the troops had to climb a volcano 2100 feet in height, having slopes of sliding materials and with the last 500 feet inclined at an angle of fifty degrees. The slopes were timbered and crossed by lava ridges and the artillery had to be raised 300 feet by block and tackle. The fanatical robber Moros refused to surrender when cornered, and in the battle which resulted about six hundred were killed, including the women, who wore trousers, carried weapons, and charged with the men in the final hand-to-hand *mêlée*. These natives sought death in battle against Christians to gain their entry into Paradise, and native boys were used as shields for protection.

Sensational reports, which had emanated, not from the island of Sulu but from Manila, and which charged the punitive expedition with inhumanity, brought an inquiry from Congress, but one which resulted in complete exoneration and proved that the General had exercised unusual patience with a view to avoid bloodshed if it were possible. It was entirely characteristic of General Wood that when he learned of the charges preferred he at

once cabled to the Department, "I assume entire responsibility for action of the troops in every particular." As the General once said, "My loyalty runs first to the man under me who is least able to defend himself."

Major Hugh L. Scott, who afterwards became General and Chief of Staff, had recently returned from the island and was familiar with the conditions there. He testified before the Congressional committee:

"General Wood, with the troops, spent the greater part of the day far from water under a tropical sun, waiting with the utmost patience on the dilatory tactics of the savages in order to accomplish the subjugation of this band without bloodshed. . . .

"The policy of General Wood in that archipelago has always been to bring about peace and order as gently and with as little loss of life as possible. . . .

"It is not conceivable that this policy of humanity, carried out in the past two years and a half, should now have been changed, as General Wood was there in person and

no one would take more trouble to avoid unnecessary bloodshed than he."

Of the mountain on which the battle occurred he said:

"It is very steep and difficult to climb under most favorable circumstances, and to climb it successfully under fire is undoubtedly a most gallant feat of arms, and unless great skill had been used many more lives would have been lost among the troops."

An army officer returning from service in the Philippines made the following statement which has been put on record and is here printed to indicate how the feeling in the army toward General Wood had been changed through close association with him:

"When Wood first came out in 1903, the army in the Philippines didn't know him. There were plenty of officers who reviled him as a favorite of the White House, and 'cussed him out' for it. The worst were

the old fellows whom he had jumped, and the youngsters took their cue from them. 'He was a doctor, he wasn't a soldier,' they said. But that didn't last long after Wood started in down in Mindanao. Pretty soon that part of the army began to realize that he was a hustler; that he knew a good deal about the soldier's game; that he did things and did them right; that, when he sent troops into the field, he went along with them; that, when they had to eat hard tack and bacon, he did it too; that, when there were swamps to plod through, he was right along with them; that, when reveille sounded before daybreak, he was usually up and dressed before us; that, when a man was down and out, and he happened to be near, he'd get off his horse and see what the matter was, and fix the fellow up, if he could; that he had a pleasant word for all hands, from the Colonel down to the teamster or packer; that when he gave an order it was a sensible one, and that he didn't change it after it went out; and that he remembered a man who did a good piece of

work, and showed his appreciation at every chance.

“Well, the youngsters began to swear by Wood, and the old chaps followed, so that from ‘cussing him out’ they began to respect him and then to admire and love him. That’s the word—love. It’s the easiest thing in the world to pick a fight out there now by saying something against Wood. It is always the same when men come in contact with him. I don’t honestly believe there is a man in the department now who wouldn’t go to hell and back for Leonard Wood. He draws men to him, they feel that he is a big man. Take the older officers, the chaps who were soldiering when he was a ‘kid.’ They all feel that, while they know their business, he knows it a lot better than they do, and that he knows it by instinct, backed up by learning.”

When General Wood returned to the United States, he left Mindanao the best governed province in the Philippines. The Moros had

been pacified and civil government set up with success. His work in the islands has been often compared to that of Kitchener, and it has been pointed out that if what Wood did in the Philippines had been accomplished in a British colony he would have been rewarded as Kitchener was. Robert Hammond Murray reports an English colonial official to have volunteered his belief that Wood would have gone even farther than Kitchener with equal opportunity, for the reason that he added to the British General's soldierly qualities and genius for administration a remarkable tact and statesmanship.

General Wood was Governor of Moro Province from July, 1903, to April, 1906, when he was advanced to the command of the Military Department of the Philippines with ten thousand men under his command, a position which he held until 1908.

In recognition of his work in colonial organization and administration in Cuba and the Philippines, the French Legion of Honor conferred upon him the next to the highest of its five orders, that of Grand Officer.

This is a tribute seldom accorded to anyone not a Frenchman, and the honor has even more rarely been awarded in time of peace.

CHAPTER III

ROOSEVELT'S ESTIMATE OF WOOD

Roosevelt and Wood planning national defence—Wood advanced mainly by Presidents McKinley and Taft—Wood the soldier—The model military administrator—Wood's hardihood and endurance—His love of adventure—The Geronimo experience—Wood shares all hardships of his men—His boundless energy—Even justice to all—His reward the opportunity for service—His sensational rise due to his own high qualities.

IT was in 1896 that Wood first met Roosevelt, who was then the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and out of this grew an attachment between two strong characters, which deepened with the years. Wood was of all men the one that Roosevelt admired and loved. Almost from their first meeting they began planning to prepare their country for the struggle with Spain, which was already looming up upon the horizon. Their later and far more difficult struggle for adequate national preparedness against the apathy and open

hostility of the Administration bound them together as with bonds of steel.

There exists a widespread but quite erroneous belief that Wood owes his rapid rise in the army—a rise without a parallel in our history—to appointments made by Roosevelt when Chief Executive of the nation. As a matter of fact Wood's appointment as Colonel and his advancements successively to Brigadier General and Major General of Volunteers, to Brigadier General in the Regular Army, as well as to Governor General of Cuba, were all made by President McKinley as war-time appointments and each was dictated by an imperative necessity. Wood's appointment as Chief of Staff of the Army was made by President Taft. The only advance in Wood's military career that was made by President Roosevelt was when he was promoted from Brigadier General to Major General in the Regular Army, and this occurred at a time when Wood headed the list of brigadiers so that a failure of the President to make the nomination would have been tantamount to an expression of his disap-

proval. As Elihu Root has expressed it, "President Roosevelt would be called upon to put him out of that rank and to dissent from the judgment of President McKinley if he had failed to nominate him."

Because of his known intimacy with Wood, Roosevelt seemed to realize that any advancement of the general which came from him would be charged by hostile critics to favoritism. Roosevelt's estimates of Wood as civil administrator and man, as well as soldier, were therefore prepared with much careful discrimination. In articles which he published in 1899, 1902, and 1910, there is contained a quite remarkable expression of judgment on the part of one great American who knew another more intimately than did anyone else. Of Wood as a soldier he knew from personal association in the command of the Rough Riders, and in his biography he says:

"It [the regiment] was raised, armed, equipped, drilled, sent on trains to Tampa, embarked, disembarked, and put through two victorious offensive—not defensive—

fight in which a third of the officers and one fifth of the men were killed or wounded, all within sixty days. It is a good record, and it speaks well for the men of the regiment; and it speaks well for Wood. . . .

“Wood was an exceptional commander, of great power, with a remarkable gift for organization. Wood won his Brigadier Generalship by the capital way in which he handled his brigade in the fight and in the following siege. He was put in command of the captured city [Santiago].”

To the *Outlook* of January 7, 1899, Roosevelt contributed a special article entitled “General Leonard Wood, a Model American Military Administrator,” and from this article the following paragraphs have been taken:

“What I am about to write concerning the great service rendered not only to Cuba, but to America, by Brigadier General Leonard Wood, now Military Governor of Santiago, is written very much less as a tribute to him than for the sake of pointing out what

an object-lesson he has given the people of the United States in the matter of administering those tropic lands in which we have grown to have so great an interest. . . .

“I think most Americans realize that facts must be faced, and that for the present, and in the immediate future, we shall have, whether we wish it or not, to provide a working government, not only for Hawaii and Porto Rico, but for Cuba and the Philippines. . . .

“What is really essential is to have first-class men chosen to administer these provinces, and then to give these men the widest possible latitude as to means and methods for solving the exceedingly difficult problems set before them. Most fortunately, we have in General Wood the exact type of man whom we need; and we have in his work for the past four months an exact illustration of how the work should be done.

“The great importance of the personal element in this work makes it necessary for me to dwell upon General Wood’s qualifications as I should not otherwise do. The

successful administrator of a tropic colony must ordinarily be a man of boundless energy and endurance; and there were probably very few men in the army at Santiago, whether among the officers or in the ranks, who could match General Wood in either respect. No soldier could outwalk him, could live with more indifference on hard and scanty fare, could endure hardship better, or do better without sleep; no officer ever showed more ceaseless energy in providing for his soldiers, in reconnoitering, in overseeing personally all the countless details of life in camp, in patrolling the trenches at night, in seeing by personal inspection that the outposts were doing their duty, in attending personally to all the thousand and one things to which a commander should attend, and to which only those commanders of marked and exceptional mental and bodily vigor are able to attend.

“General Wood was a Cape Cod boy; and to this day there are few amusements for which he cares more than himself to sail a

small boat off the New England coast, especially in rough weather. He went through the Harvard Medical School in 1881-82, and began to practice in Boston; but his was one of those natures which, especially when young, frets for adventure and for those hard and dangerous kinds of work where peril blocks the path to a greater reward than is offered by more peaceful occupations. A year after leaving college he joined the army as a contract surgeon, and almost immediately began his service under General Miles in the Southwestern Territories. These were then harried by the terrible Apaches; and the army was entering on the final campaigns for the overthrow of Geronimo and his fellow renegades. No one who has not lived in the West can appreciate the incredible, the extraordinary fatigue and hardship attendant upon these campaigns. There was not much fighting, but what there was, was of an exceedingly dangerous type; and the severity of the marches through the waterless mountains of Arizona,

New Mexico, and the northern regions of Old Mexico (whither the Apache bands finally retreated) were such that only men of iron could stand them. But the young contract doctor, tall, broad-chested, with his light-yellow hair and blue eyes, soon showed the stuff of which he was made. Hardly any of the whites, whether soldiers or frontiersmen, could last with him; and the friendly Indian trailers themselves could not wear him down. In such campaigns it soon becomes essential to push forward the one actually fitted for command, whatever his accidental position may be; and Wood, although only a contract surgeon, finished his career against the Apaches by serving as commanding officer of certain of the detachments sent out to perform peculiarly arduous and dangerous duty; and he did his work so well and showed such conspicuous gallantry that he won that most coveted of military distinctions, the medal of honor. On expeditions of this kind, where the work is so exhausting as to call for the last ounce of reserve strength and

courage in the men, only a very peculiar and high type of officer can succeed. Wood, however, never called upon his men to do anything that he himself did not do. They ran no risk that he did not run; they endured no hardship which he did not endure; intolerable fatigue, intolerable thirst, never-satisfied hunger, and the strain of unending watchfulness against the most cruel and dangerous of foes—through all this Wood led his men until the final hour of signal success. When he ended the campaigns, he had won the high regard of his superior officers, not merely for courage and endurance, but for judgment and entire trustworthiness. A young man who is high of heart, clean of life, incapable of a mean or ungenerous action, and bursting with the desire to honorably distinguish himself, needs only the opportunity in order to do good work for his country.

“This opportunity came to Wood with the outbreak of the Spanish War. I had seen much of him during the preceding year. Being myself fond of outdoor exercise, I had

found a congenial companion in a man who had always done his serious duties with the utmost conscientiousness, but who had found time to keep himself, even at thirty-seven, a first-class football player. We had the same ideals and the same way of looking at life; we were fond of the same sports; and, last, but not least, being men with families, we liked, where possible, to enjoy these sports in company with our small children. We therefore saw very much of each other; and we had made our plans long in advance as to what we should do if war with Spain broke out; accordingly, he went as Colonel, and I was Lieutenant Colonel, of the Rough Riders. How well he commanded his regiment is fresh in the minds of every one. Because of his success he was made Brigadier General, and at the battle of San Juan he commanded one of the two brigades which made up General Joe Wheeler's Cavalry Division. When Santiago surrendered, he was soon put in charge, first of the city and then of the city and province.

“Since then he has worked wonders. Both his medical and his military training stood him in good stead. I was frequently in Santiago after the surrender, and I never saw Wood when he was not engaged on some one of his multitudinous duties. He was personally inspecting the hospitals; he was personally superintending the cleaning of the streets; he was personally hearing the most important of the countless complaints made by Cubans against Spaniards, Spaniards against Cubans, and by both against Americans; he was personally engaged in working out a better system of sewerage or in striving to secure the return of the land-tillers to the soil. I do not mean that he ever allowed himself to be swamped by mere details; he is much too good an executive officer not to delegate to others whatever can safely be delegated; but the extraordinary energy of the man himself is such that he can in person oversee and direct much more than is possible with the ordinary man.

“To General Wood has fallen the duty of

preserving order, of seeing that the best Cubans begin to administer the government, of protecting the lives and properties of the Spaniards from the vengeance of their foes, and of securing the best hygienic conditions possible in the city; of opening the schools, and of endeavoring to re-establish agriculture and commerce in a ruined and desolate land.

“The sanitary state of the city of Santiago was frightful beyond belief. The Cuban army consisted of undisciplined, unpaid men on the verge of becoming mere bandits. The Cuban chiefs were not only jealous of one another, but, very naturally, bitterly hostile to the Spaniards who remained in the land. On the other hand, the men of property, not only among the Spaniards, but even among the Cubans, greatly feared the revolutionary army. All conditions were ripe for a period of utter anarchy, and under a weak, a foolish, or a violent man this anarchy would certainly have come. General Wood, by his energy, his firmness, his common sense, and his

moderation, has succeeded in working as great an improvement as was possible in so short a time. By degrees he has substituted the best Cubans he can find in the places both of the old Spanish officials and of the Americans who were put in temporary control. He permits not the slightest violence either on the part of the American soldiers or of the inhabitants; he does absolute, even justice to all. He shows that he thinks of himself only in so far as he desires to win an honorable reputation for doing his work—and even this desire for an honorable reputation, it must be remembered, is absolutely secondary in his mind to the desire that the work itself should be thoroughly done, let the credit go where it will.”

Three years later, writing in the *Harvard Graduates' Magazine*, Roosevelt supplemented the above account by a brief summary of which the following paragraph is a part:

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“Leonard Wood four years ago went down to Cuba, has served there ever since, has rendered services to that country of the kind which if performed three thousand years ago would have made him a hero mixed up with the sun god in various ways; a man who devoted his full life through those four years, who thought of nothing else, did nothing else, save to try to bring up the standard of political and social life in that island, to clean it physically and morally, to make justice even and fair in it, to found a school system which should be akin to our own, to teach the people after four centuries of misrule that there were such things as governmental righteousness and honesty and fair play for all men on their merits as men. He did all that. He is a man of slender means. He did it on his pay as an army officer, and as Governor of the island. Sixty millions of dollars passed through his hands, and he came out having been obliged to draw on his slender capital in order that he might come out even when he left the island.”

In his book, *The Rough Riders*, Roosevelt wrote:

“General Leonard Wood combines in a very high degree the qualities of entire manliness with entire uprightness and cleanliness of character. He is a man of high ideals who scorns everything mean and base and who possesses those robust and hardy qualities of body and mind for the lack of which no merely negative virtue can atone. He is by nature a soldier of the highest type.”

Later, in *Everybody's Magazine*, the ex-President added:

“What I said of Leonard Wood in *The Rough Riders* I now say with greater emphasis than ever. He has shown himself one of the most useful and patriotic of American public servants, and has made all good Americans his debtors by what he has done.”

In July of the year 1910, when Wood's work in Santiago had been followed by that remarkable achievement in the capacity of Governor General of the island, and then by the pacification of the Moros in the Philippines and the setting up of civil government there, Roosevelt again took up his pen in order to summarize these later achievements. In the *Outlook* he wrote in part:

“Nearly twelve years ago, when Leonard Wood was acting as Governor of Santiago, I wrote in the *Outlook* about what he had already achieved, and what he could be trusted to achieve. During the intervening twelve years he has played a very conspicuous part among the men who have rendered signal service to the country by the way in which they have enabled it to grapple with the duties and responsibilities incurred by the Spanish War. . . .

“The share of the army in the honor roll is very large. The importance of work like that of General Bell in the Philippines, of General Barry in Cuba, can hardly be over-

estimated; but as a whole, of all the work of the army officers, the greatest in amount, and the greatest in variety of achievement, must be credited to General Wood. And, moreover, he has at times combined with singular success the functions of civil administrator and military commandant. The part played by the United States in Cuba has been one of the most honorable ever played by any nation in dealing with a weaker Power, one of the most satisfactory in all respects; and to General Wood more than to any other man is due the credit of starting this work and conducting it to a successful conclusion during the earliest and most difficult years. Like almost all of the men mentioned, as well as their colleagues, General Wood of course incurred the violent hatred of many dishonest schemers and unscrupulous adventurers, and of a few more or less well-meaning persons who were misled by these schemers and adventurers; but it is astounding to any one acquainted with the facts to realize, not merely what he accomplished, but how he succeeded in

gaining the good will of the enormous majority of the men whose good will could be won only in honorable fashion. Spaniards and Cubans, Christian Filipinos and Moros, Catholic ecclesiastics and Protestant missionaries—in each case the great majority of those whose opinion was best worth having—grew to regard General Wood as their special champion and ablest friend, as the man who more than any other understood and sympathized with their peculiar needs and was anxious and able to render them the help they most needed. In Cuba he acted practically as both civil and military head; and after he had been some time in the Philippines, very earnest pressure was brought to bear by many of the best people in the islands to have a similar position there created for him, so that he could repeat what he had done in Cuba. It was neither necessary nor desirable that this position should be created; but the widely expressed desire that it should be created was significant of the faith in the man.

“His administration was as signally suc-

cessful in the Moro country as in Cuba. In each case alike it brought in its train peace, an increase in material prosperity, and a rigid adherence to honesty as the only policy tolerated among officials. His opportunity for military service has not been great, either in the Philippines or while he was the Governor of Cuba. Still, on several occasions he was obliged to carry on operations against hostile tribes of Moros, and in each case he did his work with skill, energy, and efficiency; and, once it was done, he showed as much humanity in dealing with the vanquished as he had shown capacity to vanquish them. In our country there are some kinds of successes which receive an altogether disproportionate financial reward; but in no other country is the financial reward so small for the kind of service done by Leonard Wood and by the other men whose names I have given above. General Wood is an army officer with nothing but an army officer's pay, and we accept it as a matter of course that he should have received practically no pecuniary reward

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for those services which he rendered in positions not such as an army officer usually occupies. There is not another big country in the world where he would not have received a substantial reward such as here no one even thinks of his receiving. Yet, after all, the reward for which he most cares is the opportunity to render service, and this opportunity has been given him once and again. He now stands as Chief of Staff of the American Army, the army in which he was serving in a subordinate position as surgeon thirteen years ago. His rise has been astonishing, and it has been due purely to his own striking qualifications and striking achievements. Again and again he has rendered great service to the American people; and he will continue to render such service in the position he now holds."

Part II

Prophet and Organizer of
Preparedness

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZING THE AMERICAN ARMY FOR DEFENCE

General Wood's splendid health and vigor—Return to the United States to command the Department of the East—Devotes himself to preparing army for defence—The Massachusetts manœuvres of 1909—Encourages rifle practice in schools—Sounds the warning to prepare—Raised to the head of the army by President Taft—Regroups the army stations so as to resist invasion—Moves to abandon needless posts—Opposition aroused in Congress—"Joker" aimed at him in army bill—Economies introduced in the army—Advocates large expansion of army at reduction of cost—Attacks system of bureau chiefs—The Texas troop concentration of 1911—Encourages military training in colleges—The idea of the Reserve Officers' Corps—Devises the Plattsburg Camps—Declares undeveloped resources useless in war.

It was in 1910 that Leonard Wood, his remarkable work in the Moro Province concluded, underwent a surgical operation upon his skull to remedy a serious condition resulting from the fracture due to a blow years before. This operation was successfully performed and less than a month thereafter he was en route to the Argentine as special ambassador, en-

gaging daily in hard contests using the medicine ball with Admiral Stanton and his staff; and General Wood has since continued to possess that perfect health and vigor and that wonderful physical energy which spring from muscular strength when combined with an iron constitution. One of the strong impressions which is carried away from every meeting with him is a radiation of energy quite independent of motion and suggesting an enormous reserve of physical power. This impression is only accentuated by the rather noticeable lameness of the left leg due to a vicious kick from a mettlesome horse. The General's limp, especially noticeable when he rises to speak on the platform, entirely disappears after a little vigorous exercise, and few men are able to keep up with him in getting about on foot.

When he returned to the United States in 1908, General Wood was promoted to the command of the Eastern Department of the Army with headquarters at Governor's Island. This was at the time the most important army command outside the national capital. Here



General and Mrs. Wood at Governor's Island

for the first time opportunity was found to devote himself to the problem of preparing the national defence for a war which he knew was certain to come upon the country in the not distant future. From a military point of view the country was in a hopeless condition to meet the attack of a foreign foe. When with Earl Roberts at the German manoeuvres of 1902 General Wood had had an opportunity to inspect the modern military machine of Germany, and he was under no illusion as to the meaning of this development of a perfected instrument of war by a state notoriously militaristic and ruled by an ambitious war lord.

As commander of the Department of the East, he had under his observation more than half of the National Guard of the country, a body of excellent personnel but organized under a vicious system which was not susceptible of enforcement of rigid discipline. Moreover, there was little opportunity for drill in larger units than that of the company, and military concentration for manoeuvres was something quite unknown.

As a great object lesson both for the

National Guard itself and for the people of the country, General Wood staged the Massachusetts manœuvres of 1909, in which the Atlantic Fleet of the Navy, the Tenth United States Cavalry, and the National Guards of New York, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia all took part.

The war ships were organized as two fleets, one that of the enemy (red), and the other the American (blue). These rival fleets, after manœuvring off the Maine coast, met with the result that the American squadron was adjudged by the umpires to have been strategically defeated, so that its remnants were forced to take refuge in the harbors of Portland and Portsmouth. The troops had been divided into American and enemy forces cooperating each with its own fleet. An immense amount of popular interest was excited in these manœuvres, which continued for five days and revealed glaring deficiencies as no other method could have done. Of the result General Wood said in a published magazine article:

“It also demonstrated to all people who looked at the problem from a military standpoint the entire inefficiency of our available forces to meet any sudden, well-organized attack, and the necessity of a decided enlargement of our organized militia and its thorough instruction and equipment.

“The people of our country are, as a rule, very ignorant of the preparedness of foreign nations and of our own unpreparedness to meet effectively any aggressive action. We are too often told of our remarkable resources and too seldom made to understand our entire unpreparedness effectively and promptly to employ them. . . . Our people sit in fancied security behind our seacoast defences, which are excellent for the purpose for which they were designed, but the general public is unaware of the general limitation of these defences. The most they can be called upon or expected to do is to prevent the enemy's fleet from entering our harbors or lying sufficiently near their entrance to bombard the cities behind them. . . . They make the enemy's

work more difficult. . . . Most of our great cities once the command of the sea is lost are open to land attack. . . . The best way to impress upon the people the necessity for action . . . is to demonstrate the facility with which an invading force can land and deliver successful attacks upon our seaboard cities."

Another direction along which it was sought to arouse the people's interest in their obligation to provide for national defence, was through the encouragement of rifle practice in the public schools. Writing in 1910, General Wood declared:

"The question arises as to what we can do through the public schools to better prepare our people for war, war which will be as unavoidable in the future as in the past, and which will come upon us much more suddenly and with greater force and power. We can, through the proper use of the public schools, do a great deal; we can teach our boys and young men to shoot straight. . . .

“In case of a war of any consequence we would be compelled to call to the colors from half a million to a million men. There would be no time to instruct them, for the oceans, under transportation conditions of to-day, are no longer barriers in military operations, but rather rapid and convenient means of communication, especially to the nation having a predominant sea-power, and the time to organize for defence will be very short. . . .

“Preparedness for war is the strongest of the influences for the preservation of peace. . . .

“Much as we all desire peace and wish by all honorable means to avoid war, war will come, and we owe it to our country to take such steps as will insure reasonable preparedness.

“We are, as a people, too conscious of our latent, but entirely undeveloped, military resources, and too much surfeited with what has been well called the ‘valor of ignorance,’ and it is most important, in view of our rapidly extending sphere of

influence, that we give some heed to the attainment of a state of preparedness to meet the grave conditions liable to confront us as a result of our new responsibility."

A little later he added:

"When war comes to this country again . . . the patriotic, able-bodied American will, as in the past, feel himself obligated the moment war is declared to offer his services to the Government.

"If he has had no previous military training in the army or in the National Guard, he is not going to be of much use; in fact, of no use in the beginning. He will be more of a burden than a benefit, a handicap instead of a help, to the force in which he is enrolled.

"He will have to be trained, instructed, taught, and the exigencies of the occasion may be such that he will be rushed into battle before he knows anything of what a soldier should know. . . .

"The encouragement of schoolboys in

the use of the rifle on official ranges and under competent instruction is of vast importance to the nation. . . .

“Far from making these boys disposed for war, the instruction which they receive . . . is calculated to cause them to appreciate, much more than anyone unlearned in the use of modern weapons could possibly appreciate, the horrors involved in war.

“Instead of opposing instruction of this kind, every parent and all school authorities should encourage it, for the better prepared our people are in the way of instruction in the use of the rifle and readiness to perform their duty in time of war, the less likely we are to have wars, and, if we have them, the quicker they will be over and the smaller will be our losses. Nothing makes war so costly as lack of preparedness, and nothing makes it so probable as to have this lack of preparation apparent and generally known. We should impress upon our youth the fact that they are all under a patriotic obligation to avail themselves of every opportunity to fit themselves to discharge the duty of a

soldier in time of war. The nation in which this is lost sight of is marked for disaster, or, at least, for very great and unnecessary sacrifices and losses in case of war."

When in 1910 General Wood was placed at the head of the army as the Chief of Staff, his opportunities for fitting the American military forces for war were greatly enlarged, and he thereupon immediately took up plans for a thorough regrouping of the stations of the army with definite reference to the possibilities of defence against invasion of the country.

During the period of the development of the Great West, it had been necessary to protect frontier districts from possible attack by hostile Indians, for which purpose a system of frontier posts generally known as forts had been established. As their need diminished increasingly with the country's rising prosperity and its extension of railroad communication, instead of being abandoned, these posts had, curiously enough, been rather generally improved as military stations through the expenditure of large sums of money upon

buildings and equipment. The army post brought business to the near-lying urban communities, and it was but natural that powerful influences should be brought to bear upon Congressmen for the purpose not only of maintaining these now useless posts, but also of enlarging and strengthening them still further. It was exceedingly difficult to interest the people in the necessity of any reform in this direction, for the reason that our citizens did not see the danger to the future safety of the country which the system involved. Notwithstanding these political difficulties the new Chief of Staff did not hesitate to attack the problem vigorously and advocate the reform by every proper means. In an article which was published in the *Independent* in 1912 he declared:

“A sound military policy demands the concentration of larger tactical units in strategic areas as an urgent necessity; as a measure tending not only to the economical administration of the army, but to a great increase in its efficiency. It demands also

the organization of a reserve and thorough instruction of the organized militia, and utilization of the army for the instruction of as many men as possible, in order that we may have instructed men enough to fill up our regular army and militia to war strength, and furnish a reserve to supply the losses incident to the first months of the war."

The strength of the Regular Army since the Spanish-American War had been fixed at one hundred thousand men, of which number only about twenty-five thousand could be regarded as a mobile force owing to the assignments to fixed garrisons, to coast fortifications, etc. General Wood boldly proposed the abandonment of all needless army posts, with a net saving of some six million dollars a year, and the establishment of new stations favorable for tactical training of all arms of the service in combination, as well as for relatively rapid concentration upon our frontiers in the event of invasion of our territory. This arrangement, which received the approval of

Mr. Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, and the General Staff, contemplated a concentration of the army in either two or three strategic groups upon the Pacific Coast, three on the Atlantic and Gulf Coast, and at least two centrally located between the Great Lakes and the Rio Grande. Such an arrangement would favor manœuvres in which the National Guard would be able to operate and get instruction from regular troops, and the plan would further be the one best adapted for expansion in the event of war.

Since Wood's plan above outlined would mean the abandonment of stations dear to local communities, it aroused bitter opposition, notwithstanding the fact that the economy in administration of the regular establishment of the army would have meant, had it been devoted to military purposes, the addition to our forces either of ten regiments of infantry or of one hundred thousand reservists, upon the basis then existing.

Representative Hay, who was in charge of the House Committee on Military Affairs and whose name was later connected with the

notorious Hay Army Appropriation Bill, led the opposition to the staff plan and succeeded also in inserting in the Army Bill a "joker" which provided that any officer who had not served ten years as an officer of the line should be barred from the position of Chief of Staff. Senator Elihu Root remarked of this provision "that it could not better accomplish its purpose if it read that after the fifth of March no man whose initials are L. W. shall be Chief of Staff." The joker could affect only one other General and it would, had it become a law in the days of the old army, have disqualified all but four of the nineteen generals who have successively occupied the position of the head of the army. Among those who would have been debarred are Winfield Scott, Sheridan, McPherson, Meade, and Hancock, while Grant and Sherman would barely have escaped ineligibility. Like most "jokers" in legislation, discovery was in this case a fatal bar to enactment into law and Mr. Hay's plans were frustrated.

The proposal to concentrate for strategic purposes was only a part of the comprehensive

plan of General Wood for the reorganization of the American military forces. He was able to show that for an army which really offered no adequate protection, the United States was actually expending every year four-fifths as much money as was France for her large and efficient military machine, and he boldly launched his plans for a partial realization of the principle of universal military training. He said:

“The needs of the United States to insure its defence against invasion by the four or five great military powers have been carefully worked out. The smallest possible provision is for an army of 450,000 men. The possibility of war upon this continent (this was written in 1912) is not immediate, it is true; but it is far greater than it was thirty-five years ago, and every year it becomes a more practical question. . . .

“The United States needs at least 450,000 men at home and in its foreign garrisons. It has something over 75,000 regulars and about 120,000 militia. Even if these men

were highly trained for war—which they are not—the country would have less than half the forces that it needs for self-defence.”

General Wood fully realized that at this time the country was not yet educated to the point of accepting the doctrine of universal military service. The 450,000 men referred to was only the number to be immediately ready. It was the first step, and behind it would come the millions of volunteers or drafted men.

In vain the Chief of Staff attacked the antiquated system of incompetence which has been and largely is, even to-day, the great weakness of the American army—the system which retains superannuated bureau chiefs who have life positions, and who, being in full charge of expenditures are in actual control of the army. The system has resulted in red tape, interminable delays, and useless records which are generally dispensed with in all modern armies, as was promptly to be learned when our officers came in contact with the French General Staff. The system was, however, too firmly rooted to be dislodged, and its

retention was a main cause of the breakdown of the army during the late World War.

The characteristic attitude of a typical bureau chief in the army was first brought home to Wood when, in outfitting his regiment of Rough Riders, he succeeded in cutting the red tape, though to the immense disgust of the chief, who in vexation burst out, "Here I had a magnificent system; my office and department were in good working order and this damned war comes along and breaks it all up." Some Americans remember how General Wood, coming home from the French front as Germany's terrible drive of the spring of 1918 was being launched, and finding inertia, confusion, and incompetence everywhere present in the War Department, declared with undiplomatic but pardonable vexation of this desperate situation that it should be met by "sand-bagging" the said bureau chiefs.

In the spring of 1911, the attempt was made to assemble an entire division of troops, the smallest body that can be considered an army. After three months of intensive work only two thirds of a division at war strength had been

brought together out of the peace-time skeleton units. Of this attempt General Wood says:

“The concentration at San Antonio demonstrated conclusively our helplessness to meet with trained troops any sudden emergency, unless an adequate reserve, from which our skeleton organizations can be filled up, is provided in time of peace. People forget that the mere assembly of arms and men is not an army. An army is a well-balanced entity with definitely prescribed parts. . . . The troops of the division which we assembled had never had any instruction as parts of a division. None of the officers had ever commanded a division; few had ever seen one, and this applied not only to the younger officers but to those of long service.

“The Texas manœuvres were a great object lesson, not of efficient organization, but of lack of efficient organization. Everybody saw this who was even moderately familiar with military matters.”

Our history has revealed only too clearly the folly of disregarding the counsel of Washington and depending upon a system of volunteer levies of troops made after, instead of before, war comes. The experience of the Civil War showed that the most serious of all our troubles was that competent officers could not be obtained to train the levies even when raised, and this led Congress to pass the Morrill Act of 1862 with supplementary legislation in 1883, 1890, and 1907. In accord with these acts, about one hundred higher educational institutions have each, under the direction of an army officer detailed for the purpose, given compulsory military instruction to their students. These institutions include private military academies, colleges of agriculture, and most state universities. The non-military institutions, generally known as land-grant institutions, comprise nearly one half the total, and in the year 1914 they gave military instruction to 23,864 men of suitable type for army officers. The amount of instruction given was, however, generally inadequate—three hours per week in term-time throughout

two years—but the material instructed was excellent, and the possibility for improvement with new legislation was most promising. General Wood devoted himself to the special development of this source of supply of army officers, and as the special menace of our involvement in the war arrived, he endeavored to extend a modification of the system to other institutions and especially to the large endowed universities of the East. In this effort he met with considerable success, notably at Princeton, Yale, and Harvard universities.

The system itself as applied to the land-grant colleges underwent decided improvement under his inspiration and guidance, but it was seriously hampered by the inadequate supply of officers furnished to the army from the Military Academy and by the terms of the Morrill Act which permitted of the detail of but one officer to any one institution, even though it might have a student body equivalent in size to that of one or more regiments. Notwithstanding these defects, some of the larger institutions, notably Illinois, Ohio State, and Cornell universities, contributed con-

siderable sums of money from their own funds for the pay of student officers, and they were thus enabled to turn out some tens of superior graduates each year, who upon the basis of careful inspection were found able to qualify as second lieutenants of volunteers.

The McKellar Bill, framed to meet the defects of the Morrill Act by increasing the number of army instructors at an institution, from one to from three to six in the case of the forty-nine larger institutions, as well as in other ways to increase the efficiency under this system of training, was not approved by the Secretary of War and hence it did not become a law.

A valuable ally in his endeavor to provide company reserve officers for the United States Army, General Wood found in Dean Edward Orton of Ohio State University, an aid who worked unselfishly to improve the character of the college military training; and, through the Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations, he secured strong endorsement for a much improved system that, under the names of the Reserve

Officers' Training Corps and Reserve Officers' Corps, was in 1916 incorporated as one of the really good features of the Hay Army Appropriation Bill. This R. O. T. C. system laid additional stress upon the military part of the training given, and supplied a strong incentive for entering the corps through providing graduates with the opportunity of service with the Regular Army as Provisional Second Lieutenants drawing full pay and allowances, and with the option, after a year of service, of going into the reserves, subject however to call in time of war.

But General Wood was not content with this promise of increasing the supply of army officers. As Chief of Staff, he devised the Plattsburg Camp system which contributed so enormously to our effort in the war. He issued as Chief of Staff *Facts of Interest Concerning the Military Resources and Policy of the United States*, which was published in January, 1914, and in which it was stated:

“The time required for the training of extemporized armies depends largely on the

presence or absence of trained instructors. If there be a corps of trained officers and non-commissioned officers and a tested organization of higher units with trained leaders and staff officers, the problem of training is limited to the training of the private soldier. This can be accomplished in a relatively short time, and under such conditions if arms and equipment are available a respectable army can be formed within six months. But where the leaders themselves are untrained and where officers and men must alike stumble toward efficiency without intelligent guidance, the formation of an efficient army is a question of years."

In his attempt to provide the trained staff of instructors, General Wood encountered apathy, and the early results were discouraging. In the first year, 1913, only 222, mostly youths, were instructed in the Plattsburg Camps. In the following year, the invitation was extended to business men of college or high school training, and though the men were

compelled to bear their own expenses, the number that passed through the camps was 667. The idea had now, however, obtained a firm hold and each graduate was a missionary who not only took up the call for national defence but who brought many others to the camps in the following years. In 1915 and 1916, the numbers which passed through the Plattsburg Camps were respectively 3406 and 16,139. The next year we entered the war, the idea was immediately adopted for the Officers' Training Camps, and of 150,000 who applied, 40,000 had within forty days been found eligible upon the basis of examination and were later passed through the first camp. Better than any statements in words these figures tell the story of what this great movement meant to the American Army entering upon its responsibilities in the war.

All this time at every opportunity, General Wood, by speaking and writing, was striving to awaken the country to the imminent need of preparing our defence without any delay whatever. To a lady in Boston who inquired of him what war it was that he would prepare

for, the General replied that if the captain of one of the ocean liners lying at the dock would tell her what particular storm it was that he was carrying the life-boats for, he also would tell her what war he desired to prepare to meet.

Speaking in 1912 he said:

“We are not fools; we have wars going on all about us; we know that wars have always occurred; we know that as long as men are men wars will always occur. Every rational man is interested in securing arbitration of such questions as can be properly arbitrated, but there are many questions which cannot be arbitrated. . . .”

“All this talk about our tremendous military resources is, under the conditions of modern war, rubbish. Undeveloped resources, in the crash of a sudden war—and modern wars are sudden—are just about as valuable an asset as would be an undeveloped gold mine in Alaska in a crisis on Wall Street. If the other nation would give us a gentlemanly notice of from six to

eighteen months that he proposes to fight, we should have some time to develop our undeveloped resources; but this is just what would not happen."

CHAPTER V

THE FIGHT AGAINST PACIFISM

Date of increased growth of the pacifist cult—Fate pointed to Leonard Wood as the prophet and organizer of national defence—The unholy alliance of professors, preachers, and socialists—Organs and agents of pacifism—The defence societies—Administrative hostility to preparedness and to opposing opinions—The American League to limit armament—Apathy of the Administration concerning the war—Mr. Wilson's peace move in September, 1914—The President declares to Congress that the country is already prepared—Orders to stifle expression of opinion by army officers—Wood is not silenced—His speech to the Mayflower Society—Endorses the American Legion and is rapped by Washington—The Plattsburg idea—The military obligation of citizenship.

ON the fourth of March, 1913, Woodrow Wilson began his administration as President of the United States. It is a date from which to reckon the sudden and sinister growth of the cult of pacifism which has become a menace for the country.

Fate had ordained that Leonard Wood, who had been bent on preparing the nation for

the coming crisis, should become the dominant spirit of the Preparedness Movement. It was very largely his knowledge and experience and his military judgment, which supplied the basis for the propaganda directed by the several defence societies later to be organized. His solemn warnings, so insistently sounded, were again and again to be flouted by the Administration. Yet every one of these warnings was destined to be confirmed by the march of events, as one painful lesson after another was to be borne in upon the much harassed American nation.

Drawn closely together through their association of Spanish-American war days, the bonds between Roosevelt and Wood waxed yet stronger in the fight against pacifism,—the greatest crisis in our history and one which more than once all but resulted in the downfall of civilization. That this did not occur at the time of Germany's March drive of 1918, was no fault of the American Government, which though already officially at war for a period of eleven months, had at the time placed in the field but four divisions of troops.

The Fight against Pacifism 131

The strength of the pacifist movement has lain very largely in an unholy and very largely unrecognized alliance of the more academic college professor with the literal preacher and the radical socialist. One has only to glance at the personnel of the boards of directors of the pacifist societies to find ample confirmation of the above statement.

It has been the policy of Germany not alone to strengthen the home country through perfecting an irresistible military machine, but at the same time to weaken and undermine the defence elements in rival countries through encouragement of every latent pacifist influence. No doubt to a large extent unconsciously, the American pacifists as a class have been cleverly exploited by the German agents, and most intensively within the period immediately preceding and during the World War. A well-known pacifist, in a review of the peace movement in America which he published in 1910, has naïvely told us how the late Professor Ernst Richard of Columbia University, the then president both of the New York and of the German-American Peace

Societies, led the German-American societies of the whole nation to commit themselves to the arbitration movement. In the same article, he gloats over the fact that Congressmen Richard Bartholdt of Missouri was the leading peace man in Congress and had "led the fight each year against the inordinate military ambition of the big navy group with remarkable success."

When the war had broken out in Europe, these two pacifist leaders soon became revealed as the enemies of America. Bartholdt, until his retirement from Congress, promoted every German move in that body, was on terms of intimacy with the Imperial German Ambassador, and founded the notorious "American Independence Union" which was shown by the *Providence Journal* to have been financed from Germany for the express purpose of furthering German political interests in the United States.

When education breaks down, propaganda must take its place in any emergency, and there is a distinction to be recognized between what might be called legitimate propaganda—



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General Wood at Plattsburg

an intensive presentation of vital facts and reasoned conclusions—and the spurious appeal to the emotions and the prejudices which is usually presented in an alluring form of fanciful phrasing, and which has not inaptly been termed “impropaganda.”

Long before the crisis came upon us with the outbreak of the war in Europe, the peace advocates had pre-empted the field, largely without opposition, and were in consequence entrenched behind the stout wall of a general commitment of the public mind uninstructed as to any counter arguments. The American Peace Society was founded in 1828 and has long maintained a magazine, *The Advocate of Peace*, as well as a corps of “peace lecturers”; and having lately been largely supported by the Carnegie millions, its disbursements annually have been in the neighborhood of \$100,000. The World Peace Foundation has had an annual income of nearly the same figure, derived from the estate of the late Edwin Ginn, the Boston publisher. Among its paid “peace lecturers” have been the British writer, Norman Angell—to whom more than to any

one not in official life the almost fatal unpreparedness of Great Britain is to be ascribed—and Dr. David Starr Jordan, who shares with William Jennings Bryan a like culpability as respects the United States. Dr. Jordan, lately the head of the National Educational Association, has infected that body with pacifism and is reported to have once made seventy peace addresses in two months and at another time to have delivered sixty peace lectures on the Pacific Coast and in the Middle West. The World Peace Foundation is reported also to have distributed twenty-five thousand sets of a series of leaflets directed against preparing the nation for defence. Andrew Carnegie's Rectorial Address at St. Andrew's University in Scotland, in which the iron magnate appealed to students not to volunteer for war service but to be conscientious objectors, was distributed in hundreds of thousands of copies and translated into several languages. The Lake Mohonk Peace Conferences were started in 1884 and the annual gatherings had been given much prominence by the American Press.

As against this record of activity of the peace

societies during the pre-war period, that of the preparedness advocates has been meagre enough. Until the war broke out in Europe there had been but one well-known American organization for the promotion of the national defence,—the Navy League—an organization which was founded during President Roosevelt's administration and with his active co-operation. Before the war it published a modest journal, *The Navy League Journal*, and it had maintained a more or less precarious existence.

With the outbreak of the war the red-blooded element of the population and the men of vision of the nation came together to support the organization and give it greater power and influence. In December, 1914, some two hundred and fifty prominent Americans came together in New York City under the leadership of Mr. S. Stanwood Menken, Major George Haven Putnam, Henry L. Stimson and others, and organized the National Security League as a non-political association to promote an adequate national defence.

Shortly after the organization of the National Security League there was formed in the office of G. P. Putnam's Sons, publishers, the American Rights League, with Major George Haven Putnam as president and moving spirit. In spite of its limited financial support, this organization played a part in arousing the nation to the responsibilities which it will be difficult to overestimate. It was throughout the indomitable will and the splendid patriotism of this veteran of the American Civil War which triumphed over one rebuff after another from a hostile administration.

No sooner had the National Security League organized, than a group of pacifists came together in New York City at the call of Bishop Greer, President Nicholas Murray Butler, Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard, and others, and founded the American League to Limit Armaments and to "voice a protest against agitation for increased armament in this country."

The violent opposition which the Administration evinced toward any expression of opinion that differed in any way from his own,

was the direct cause of a division within the National Security League between those who believed that the Administration should not, or could not, be wisely opposed, even when his policy would leave the country open to invasion, and those who favored more independent action. This conflict of opinion resulted in the more outspoken elements of the League seceding from the original organization and in July, 1915, founding the American Defence Society with Theodore Roosevelt as Honorary President and Dr. David Jayne Hill and President John Grier Hibben of Princeton University on the directing board.

War was declared in Europe during the first week of August, 1914, and the atrocities and the rape of Belgium occurred August 5th-8th and August 11th-14th. On August 19th, the President issued a proclamation in which he said, "We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another." The first reverse to the German army at the battle

of the Marne was already beginning to be apparent on September 7th, on which date the Kaiser sent to Mr. Wilson that remarkable request for "an impartial opinion" concerning the war. The President replied, "I am honored that you should have turned to me as the representative of a people truly disinterested as regards the present war. . . . I speak thus frankly because I know you will expect and wish me to do so as one friend speaks to another," and entered no protest whatever against the barbarous acts of Germany.

Acting upon stimulation from Count von Bernstorff on this first German setback, Mr. Wilson proclaimed on September 9th a day of prayer for peace, and he began negotiations through Berlin with a view to bringing it about. His effort was effectually blocked by the Allies in their agreement not to make peace without common consent.

Though under the Constitution the President is Commander-in-Chief of the military and naval forces of the Republic, and though with the outbreak of war in Europe every other neutral nation of any consequence began

to give thought to the national defence; Mr. Wilson evinced not the slightest interest in our country's unprotected condition, and it is known that he made no endeavors to secure correct information upon national defence from any responsible officer of either the army or navy other than the civilian secretaries. Whether the warnings which were volunteered in most decisive terms penetrated into his seclusion cannot be positively asserted, but it is known that Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, the Naval Aide for Operations (the highest ranking officer of the navy and the nearest equivalent in our navy to a Chief of Staff), sent an official letter to the Secretary of the Navy which was dated November 9, 1914, and which reported the navy "unprepared for war." This official letter of warning from our foremost naval strategist was pigeon-holed by the Secretary, who afterward publicly denied that he had ever received it. Admiral Fiske's diary, which has since been published, shows, however, that there were several sharp exchanges between him and the Secretary upon the subject and the letter was later unearthed in response

to a resolution of the United States Senate and widely published throughout the country on April 23, 1915. The American Defence Society on May 12, 1916, drew the President's attention to this letter and on May 22d received his acknowledgment of the communication.

On December 17, 1914, Admiral Fiske testified before the House Committee on Naval Affairs that not only was the navy not ready for war, but that it could not be made ready in five years, and these statements were at once published throughout the country. Notwithstanding these facts, the Secretary of the Navy in his report dated December, 1914, wrote: "This has been a proud and solemn year for the American navy. . . . Allow me, Mr. President, to congratulate you as its Commander-in-Chief upon the record it has made, upon its preparedness for duty, upon the reliance you can place upon it in any time of national need."

Disregarding the solemn warnings of General Wood and Admiral Fiske that we were utterly unprepared in a military sense, Mr.

Wilson, speaking on December 8, 1914, declared to the joint houses of Congress:

“We shall not alter our attitude because some amongst us are nervous and excited. . . . The question has not changed its aspects because the times are not normal. . . . Let there be no misconception. The country has been misinformed. We have not been negligent of national defence.”

Yet considerably more than a year later General Wood felt compelled to say:

“We know this, that if a war does hit us, we have not in any particular—I make no exception whatever—adequate reserve materials for the first force we should have to call.”

From the outbreak of the war, the Administration took strong means to stifle expressions concerning defence necessities. Like Lord Roberts in England, General Wood and Admiral Fiske in this country, in this supreme crisis, elected to warn the country at whatever

cost to their own careers. On February 23, 1915, General Order No. 10 was issued to the army enjoining officers to "refrain, until further orders, from giving out for publication any interview, statement, discussion, or article on the military situation in the United States or abroad, as any expression of their views on the subject at present is prejudicial to the best interests of the service."

Had this order been strictly obeyed by General Wood, it is not unlikely that the war might have had a different ending, for it was his voice of authority, reinforced by the splendid support and the wonderful prestige of the strenuous ex-President, and echoed and sent abroad by George Haven Putnam, Henry A. Wise Wood, James M. Beck, and others, and by the defence societies generally, which quickened the patriotic national conscience and aroused the fighting spirit of the nation. Speaking before the Mayflower Society, General Wood said:

"The deeds of our ancestors are things to be proud of. But our duty to our descend-

ants is something to be thinking of now. The country has never been in a more critical condition than it is to-day, and what the future brings to us must depend very much upon the wisdom of our people. . . . We owe it to ourselves and to those who come after us to take heed, not to the idle prating of dreamers, but to the stern facts which surround us and which lie ahead of us. What we want must not influence us too much; we must take into consideration conditions which we must meet. We may desire world peace, we may believe in arbitration, and we may pray devoutly that war will never come to us, but we should not forget the teachings of history or neglect the observation and deductions of common sense. . . .

“In the old times, when weapons were simple, and almost every man had to use a weapon of some sort to get a part of his food, training in the use of arms was easily acquired. In these days, when arms are intricate, and it takes a long time to learn how to use them; when steam navigation

and rapid transit have divided the distance that separates us from our possible enemies by ten, it is all the more necessary that preparation should be made in advance. It is all nonsense to say that untrained men can meet with success just as good men well-trained and well-disciplined."

In March of 1915, with the approval of General Wood, the American Legion was organized with a view to secure a first reserve of 250,000 to 300,000 men, all of whom would agree to respond at once to any call for service. Washington indicated its displeasure, and, without first consulting the General to determine whether the absurd charges made through the press by the pacifist Bishop Greer were true, demanded an investigation to see whether this was not in violation of General Order No. 10 enjoining officers of the army from comment on the military situation. The correspondence which followed entirely vindicated the General by showing conclusively that the charges made in the press were without foundation; but the intent of the rap from

headquarters to force him into silence was not lost either upon the General or upon the public.

A desire on the part of the public to know the truth began now to be more apparent, and General Wood's addresses on the subject of preparedness were in demand. Located at Governor's Island in New York Harbor, he was able to speak to public audiences in the Metropolis or at near-lying communities, and did so sometimes two or three times a week. While scrupulously careful to make no criticism of his superiors, he nevertheless lost no opportunity to drive home those fundamental lessons which the crisis demanded. His time was, however, in the main given over to the building up of the military forces under his jurisdiction, and these included the National Guard which it was his duty to inspect.

The Plattsburg Camps for the training of officers which he had planned and organized in 1913 and originally intended for youths only, were now extended to those business men of the country who had had college or high school instruction and whose careers in the business

world showed that they were especially fitted to become officers in the army. Under the inspiration of the General, the business men responded to the call with enthusiasm, and having passed through the camps they went out as so many missionaries to spread the gospel of preparedness. Such men as Robert Bacon, a former Secretary of State of the United States, and John Purroy Mitchel, the Mayor of New York City, elected to become "rookies," and the splendid effect of their influence it would be difficult to overestimate. In the campaign which the General made to secure recruits for the camps, as well as in lectures delivered to the men, the opportunity was found to sound the call to arms and to dispel the erroneous impressions concerning what the military history of the country has been. In setting forth the purpose of these camps the General said in an address:

"The Plattsburg Idea is expressed by the words—'Preparation for National Service.' Primarily, service in war, because training for such service is generally wanting in this



Mayor Mitchel and General Wood reviewing parade of the Alaska soldiers at New York City Hall

country. Incidentally, the training is training for life, for with the spirit of service for the nation in time of war goes the spirit of service for the nation and the community in time of peace. The Plattsburg spirit voices the principle of individual obligation for national service and an appreciation of the fact that with equality of opportunity and service goes equally the obligation to the limit of our physical and mental capacity.

“It is the spirit of patriotism; it voices Universal Military Service. At first it was a voice crying in the wilderness. Now it is becoming a voice which is heard in the highways and byways of the nation. It is not only a call to service, an appeal to every man’s sense of duty, but it is also a voice of warning—an attempt to awaken a slumbering people to a sense of present unpreparedness and inability to meet its soldier responsibility by citizens of a democracy,—of a democracy whose main army in time of real stress and trouble, in case of war with a strong nation must be the people, trained to reasonable efficiency in the use of arms in

order that they may be able to effectively defend their country in time of need. . . .

“It appeals to the good sense of our women to remember that while we are striving for world peace, and all in agreement that war is horrible and regrettable, that nevertheless it is often necessary and unavoidable in the discharge of our duties and in the defence of the right. It appeals to them not to permit conditions to continue which will certainly result in their men being sent into the struggle against their better prepared antagonists willing, but almost useless, sacrifices. . . .

“It (the Plattsburg spirit) strives to impress upon the people that the sinews of war are not number and wealth alone. On the contrary, that the real sinews of war are the bodies and spirits of men, trained and disciplined, and backed by the spirit of sacrifice and an appreciation of citizenship obligation in war as well as in peace. . . .

“If the Plattsburg spirit becomes the spirit of the nation, the result will be na-

tional solidarity to an extent never before dreamt of in this land of ours. . . .

“A general acceptance of the Plattsburg idea means the building up of a spirit of real Americanism, a spirit which will be strong, to make America what she must be if she is going to endure—a real melting pot—in which the various, and often discordant elements which are now swarming to our shores will be fused into one common mass of Americanism. It means the creation of a nation, animated and actuated by a strong national spirit. . . . We shall have a national spirit actuated by high purpose and firm resolve, replacing sentimentality marked by unwholesome characteristics—characteristics which foreshadow the decadence of a people.”

In 1915, General Wood lectured before the students of Princeton University on “The Military Obligation of Citizenship,” and his lectures were issued in book form by the University with an introduction by President Hibben. In these lectures, as in all others which he

delivered, the preparation which the General enjoined was not *for* but *against* war; and he spoke before students not only at Princeton but at Harvard University, at Williams College, at the University of Michigan, and elsewhere.

CHAPTER VI

THE DARKENING OF COUNSEL

Colonel House urges lifting the British blockade—German agents preach “Freedom of the Seas”—“Weasel” words, notes, and ultimatums—House under pressure urges the President to secure expert reports on national defence—These reports kept secret against public protest—Wood blamed for Roosevelt’s address at Plattsburg—Mr. Wilson supports view that the war was not made in Germany—The country deceived by the President on nature of expert reports—Henry A. Wise Wood forces out the secret report—Mr. Wilson pares down the defence programme—Naval officers punished for revealing the truth—Secretary Daniels deceives Congressional committee regarding naval deficiencies.

ALREADY in the spring of 1915 the British blockade of Germany, though not rigidly and effectively enforced for fear of alienating American sentiment, was nevertheless pressing upon the enemy’s vitals and causing great distress and greater apprehension. American and other neutral shippers were making unheard of profits by even this restricted trade with Germany, and the German cry for “Freedom of the Seas” was resounding from every

American rostrum where German propagandists could get a hearing. The Kaiser's agents, Count von Bernstorff, Dr. Dernburg, and Dr. Kuehnemann were expounding this doctrine both in and out of season.

In a little tract by Dr. Kuehnemann which was printed in the German language and widely circulated among German-Americans, it was declared that the Germans "fight the good fight for the freedom of the seas, for the freedom of nations; their victory is the one hope of civilization itself." President Wilson dispatched to the British Government numerous protests, each more vigorous than the last, against the restrictions which were being placed upon the American trade, and his confidential adviser, Colonel House, was sent abroad as a "superambassador" (not confirmed by the United States Senate), and he made arrangements with the German Foreign Office for the setting up of freedom of the seas through lifting the British blockade. German consent to this project was, of course, assured in advance and was at once accorded, but Colonel House naturally met with no success

in his efforts to induce the British Government to adopt a policy which must inevitably spell defeat for the Allies, and the full success of Germany's plan for conquest.

When, during the illness of Colonel House at Paris, the false news was spread in the press that he had died, Count von Bernstorff gave to the Berlin *Tageblatt* an interview in which he said:

“No more honest pacifist ever lived. He told me personally that he had just as energetically protested in London against the British blockade as the U-boat war, and couldn't believe that either would lead to a decision. . . . I deeply deplore that I did not see this dear friend once more and that he did not live to see the perfection of his grand ideals.”

On the 7th of May, 1915, after deliberate preparations, Germany perpetrated the outrage of sinking the *Lusitania*, an act of Hunnish barbarism which profoundly moved the American people, more than a hundred of

whom had been sacrificed; but officially it brought only the reaction of the "too proud to fight" address, and that long series of diplomatic notes which extended over a year and ten months.

Unsuccessful in his attempt to lift the British blockade, Colonel House returned to Washington, and some months later Mr. Wilson appeared before the joint houses of Congress to advocate the twin policies of "peace without victory" and "freedom of the seas."

A month after the *Lusitania* outrage, the Conference Committee on National Preparedness was organized among the defence societies, with Henry A. Wise Wood as chairman. The wisdom of this union of effort was at once to be proven, though the facts which we are here to present have not before been given to the public. The chairman of the Conference Committee was a friend of John Hays Hammond, and both he and Mr. Hammond were, during the summer, the neighbors of Colonel House at his home near Cape Ann, Massachusetts. Since House was the unique confidential friend of the President, Wood made a

strong appeal to Hammond to see if he could not through House get the President to move in the now desperate matter of preparing our national defence. This Hammond did, but with no other result than a suggestion from House to get in touch with the Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison. This failing to bring results, the appeal was renewed by Mr. Wise Wood, though in a different way. In a personal letter he writes:

“I hunted up Hammond and told him something really had to be done, saying that the sentiment for preparedness was rising so rapidly throughout the country that the inactivity of the Administration would soon become a public scandal, and that the Democratic party would have only the President to thank if it should be utilized by its political opponents. I suggested that Hammond see House again and point out to him the *political* danger into which the President was running because of his refusal to take the steps necessary to prepare the army and navy for active service.

“ Hammond said that he would act at once, and did. He saw House and told the latter that unless proper defensive measures were immediately taken by the Administration, the President might expect the Republican party to make a political issue of Wilson’s inactivity. Hammond told House that while the Republican party would not wish to make political capital out of such a matter, Mr. Wilson was so shaping affairs that the Republican party in order to fulfil its duty would be compelled to attack him for his dereliction. This, Hammond told me, greatly aroused Colonel House, who said that he would write at once to the President, at Cornish, and recommend that something be done. Immediately after Mr. Hammond’s action, came Mr. Wilson’s half-hearted request for recommendations by the General Board of the Navy and the General Staff of the Army.”

These requests for reports on what was necessary for the national defence were sent from Cornish on July 21st, and the reports of

the two boards were submitted to the President on July 30th. The reports of these expert boards, containing as they did such vitally important information for the safety of the country, were not made public. In the public mind was the question, Was the President right when he assured the joint houses of Congress, and through them the nation, that they had been misinformed and that the national defence was already secure? or, Did a desperate condition exist such as General Wood, Admiral Fiske, Mr. Wise Wood, Congressman Gardner, and a number of former Secretaries of War had asserted? If these latter were right and the President wrong, it was obviously necessary to at once utilize every available agency to the end of supporting representatives in Congress when that body should meet and take up the consideration of the necessary appropriation bills. In this period of suspense, the National Defence Society presented to the President a formal request that the recommendations of the expert boards be made public. In the dispatches of November 16, 1915, it was given

out, after a Cabinet meeting, that Mr. Wilson, against the advice of the then Secretary of War (Mr. Garrison) refused to make these recommendations public; his attitude being reported to be that as head of the Government he was responsible for the general policies urged and that his decisions should be given out in advance of the recommendations of the experts.

About a fortnight later the first great Congress of the National Security League was held at Chicago, and three former Secretaries of War joined with the entire convention in unanimously passing a resolution which requested the President to at once make public the recommendations of the experts. The word *recommendations*, rather than *reports*, was used in the resolution so that it should be clear that nothing which the public was not entitled to know (such as secret military information) was intended. The request was denied, the only reply vouchsafed being a note from the President's secretary acknowledging receipt of the resolution.

In the summer of 1915 ex-President Roose-

velt was one of a number of public men who addressed the "rookies" at the Plattsburg Camp. Unfortunately, the report of his address, which had been prepared with special care and had been gone over with General Wood and Robert Bacon and received their approval, was, in the press accounts, combined with statements which Mr. Roosevelt had made when talking to press correspondents outside the military reservation as he was waiting for the train to take him back to New York. Some of the statements which appeared in this interview, but which were not made in the Plattsburg address, were that for thirteen months the United States had played an ignoble part among the nations and had tamely submitted to seeing the weak whom we had covenanted to protect, grievously wronged; that we had seen our men, women, and children murdered on the high seas without action on our part; and had used elocution as a substitute for action. "Reliance upon high-sounding words unbacked by deeds," said Colonel Roosevelt, "is proof of a mind that dwells only in the realm of shadow and

of sham." He denounced those who would substitute the platitudes of peace congresses for military preparedness.

For permitting the supposed address to be made, Secretary Garrison administered a rebuke to General Wood, to which the General promptly replied: "Your telegram received, and the policy laid down will be rigidly adhered to."

Even before the *Lusitania* outrage, red-blooded Americans who were not pro-German in their sympathies had probably with few exceptions become convinced that the World War had been made in Germany as a war of conquest, and their sentiments had been well voiced by the late Congressman Gardner when he declared that the issue was one between autocracy and democracy, and that before we could have lasting peace one or the other must go down in ruins. The German propaganda, however, aided by a few renegade Britishers, had been going to great lengths in order to show that instead of being made in Germany the war was the work of diplomats, that one nation was as guilty as another, or if any one



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Charles E. Hughes and General Wood at Plattsburg

was more culpable than the others it was Great Britain. Unfortunately, on a number of occasions this German motif was exploited by President Wilson in his speeches. In September, 1914, after the Battle of the Marne and the rape of Belgium, he wrote to the Kaiser that he was "the representative of a people truly disinterested as respects the present war." In May, 1916, he said of the war in a public address, "with its causes and its objects we are not concerned. The obscure fountains from which its stupendous flood has burst forth we are not interested to search for or explore." Seven months later in another address he said:

"Have you ever heard what started the present war? If you have, I wish you would publish it because nobody else has so far as I can gather. Nothing in particular started it but everything in general. There had been growing up in Europe a mutual suspicion, an interchange of conjectures about what this government and that government was going to do, an interlacing of

alliances and understandings, a complex web of intrigue and spying, that presently was sure to entangle the whole of the family of mankind on that side of the water in its meshes."

Two months later, speaking for the United States in a note to the Allied nations dated December 20, 1916, the President "took the liberty" of calling attention to the fact that the "objects which the statesmen of belligerents of both sides have in mind are virtually the same."

During the summer and the autumn of 1915 there was ever increasing impatience over the inaction of the Administration with respect to the national defence, but this feeling was to some extent kept in check by vague suggestions which emanated from Washington that Mr. Wilson was earnestly considering the whole matter and would presently make public his programme. In the autumn the Secretary of the Navy announced the appointment of a "Naval Consulting Board" upon which men of the highest technical attainments had

been placed on recommendations by the scientific and technical associations of the country. The opinion prevailed quite generally that this Board, composed as it was of such eminent experts, was to give counsel to the Administration on matters of national defence, and the existence of such a Board no doubt quieted the country through dissemination of the belief that those fundamental questions of national defence and national policy in respect to the war were being considered by the Board. As a matter of fact it was announced at the initial meeting of the Board that it was not to concern itself with such questions as the size of the navy, etc.—that is, with preparedness questions—but that its recommendations were to be “technical merely.”

During President Roosevelt's administration, the United States Navy had been rated second in strength among the navies of the world; under President Taft the navy fell to the third place; and under President Wilson to the fourth rank. It was Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood who was the first to actively urge before the country the restoration of our navy to its

former position of relative strength. The matter was taken up in conference with Colonel Roosevelt, who entirely approved of Mr. Wise Wood's programme and gave him a strong letter of endorsement to be used upon a suitable occasion.

With the assembling of Congress in November, 1915, it was inevitable that the subject of national defence should come up and the recommendations of the experts, which had been kept secret despite the appeals of the defence societies, must now be made public. Early in November the President at the anniversary celebration of the New York Manhattan Club first announced his programme of defence. "No thoughtful man," he said, "feels any panic haste in this matter. The country is not threatened from any quarter." Of his programme of defence he said, "In it there is no pride of opinion. It represents the best professional and expert opinion of the country."

The President's plan for enlargement of the naval establishment called for the expenditure of only a hundred million dollars a year; but

this was put before the public as a five-year programme and played up in the press in consequence as a demand for a half-billion dollars. This programme would have left our navy even at the end of the five-year period in its same position relative to Germany. The banquet in commemoration of the Manhattan Club at which the President presented his programme was attended by the heads of the various defence societies, who listened with hopes again dashed by this inadequate preparedness programme masked in high-sounding phrases. Said the President:

“In doing this I have tried to purge my heart of all personal and selfish motives. For the time being I speak as the trustee and guardian of a nation’s rights, charged with the duty of speaking for that nation in matters involving her sovereignty—a nation too big and generous to be exacting and yet courageous enough to defend its rights and the liberties of its people wherever assailed or invaded.”

When the President's preparedness scheme was thus made public, the defence societies found themselves once more divided as to whether it was either wise or expedient to oppose him openly by bold attack upon these inadequate proposals. The chairman of the Conference Committee on National Preparedness, Mr. Wise Wood, left the banquet to speak on preparedness before the Chamber of Commerce in the city of Portland on the following evening. Before leaving the banquet he told Mr. Garrison, the Secretary of War, that in this address he would make the reply of the Preparedness Movement to the President's speech. Arriving in Portland, he found that the President, Secretary Garrison, and Secretary Daniels had all sent telegrams to the Chamber of Commerce expressing their interest in air defence (Mr. Wood was President of the Association of Aeronautical Engineers and an authority upon questions of air defence). In his Portland address, Mr. Wise Wood put forth publicly for the first time the programme for re-establishing the American Navy in the position of second naval power,



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General Wood and Secretary Garrison at Dayton, Ohio, during the flood

and he read the endorsement of his plan by ex-President Roosevelt in the letter written at Oyster Bay a few days before. In this letter Colonel Roosevelt said in part:

“I wish to express my hearty concurrence in the position you have taken upon national preparedness.”

After repeating Mr. Wise Wood's statement concerning our country's military and naval obligations, the ex-President continued:

“And in order to meet these irrevocable obligations, the nation should immediately:

“Enter upon the construction of a navy which in size and efficiency shall be such as speedily to restore it to the position it formerly held, of second naval power in the world; and amplify its military strength so as to provide an adequate mobile army as an incident to providing the means for successfully and immediately resisting any expedition that any one of the great military nations may be capable of putting on our shores.

“Our people are under obligations to you for having so clearly placed before them their immediate duty. . . . The instant needs, however, are two. First, we should at once enter upon a comprehensive plan of naval construction which shall at the earliest possible moment make us the second naval power of the world. Second, we must insist upon the publication by the Government of the plans of the General Staff of the army, so that the people may know what their military experts regard as the vital military needs of the Republic.”

Of his programme of defence the President had said, “In it there is no pride of opinion. It represents the best professional and expert opinion of the country.” Now it was true that the President’s programme was based on reports of the army and navy experts, but in so far at least as the naval part of this programme was concerned, it was based not on the original report of the General Board of the navy as to what they considered necessary, but upon a substitute report as to how to

spend the sum of \$100,000,000, which was all that the President was willing to recommend; and, moreover he had still further pared down this pared-down report. His statement to the people that his programme represented the "best professional and expert opinion of the country" can therefore hardly be regarded as correctly setting forth the facts. The reports of the Secretaries of War and Navy were shortly after given to the press, but the truth concerning the naval programme of the experts was not made known until Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood had resigned from the Consulting Board of the navy and in so doing had made public a caustic letter to the Secretary of the Navy. This letter of Mr. Wood had the effect of forcing the publication of the original report of the General Board. It was then learned that whereas the General Board in its original report of July 30th had called for the laying down in the first year of construction of four dreadnaughts and four battle-cruisers, the pared-down report to a sum stipulated by the President and submitted October 12th, reduced the number of battle-cruisers to two

with large reductions also in the auxiliary vessels in the programme; and that Mr. Wilson's programme, *actually cut the original programme in half and called for but two dreadnaughts and two battle-cruisers, instead of four each, the number declared to be absolutely necessary by Admiral Dewey and his General Board.*

To their honor be it said that several naval officers of the highest rank did not hesitate to risk their positions by telling the truth concerning the vital defects of the naval establishment, though they were in some cases punished for doing so. Admiral Fiske, in an official letter to the Secretary, not only declared the navy unprepared but asserted that five years would be necessary to get it ready. Admiral Fletcher, in a letter to the House Committee on Naval Affairs, called attention to "an alarming shortage of officers and men" in his own (the Atlantic) fleet, on which our defence would chiefly be based—a shortage of 5219 men and 339 officers on the 21 ships under his command. Admiral Winslow and Commander Stirling supported these statements by other data.

The Pacifist Secretary of the Navy, Jose-

phus Daniels, made false statements concerning the condition of the navy, and when called before the Naval Committee of Congress said, "We should go on just as if there were no war. We have enough men in the navy." When the sentence in the report of the Navy General Board to the effect "that the want of a trained personnel is of even more serious importance than construction" was read to him in Committee, Mr. Daniels retorted, "We have a trained personnel great enough to man every ship in use. I do not think the Board would have put that in if they had known the facts."—The Board was composed of the best naval experts in the service under the chairmanship of Admiral Dewey.

"Have we a fleet sufficient to defend both coasts?" asked Representative Stevens of California. "Yes, sir, altogether sufficient to defend both coasts," replied the Secretary.

Is it any wonder that Henry Breckenridge, who until he resigned with his chief, was the Assistant Secretary of War, should have declared that Mr. Daniels was the one man

who more than any other had stood in the way of the preparation of the American navy for war?

In his report containing his programme for naval enlargement, Secretary Daniels had given out as a reason for not advocating a larger naval programme, that the one adopted was the largest that could possibly be constructed in the yards of the country. By showing up the falsity of this statement, Mr. Wise Wood was able to induce the House Committee on Naval Affairs to recommend a considerably enlarged programme. To accomplish this, however, it had first been necessary to force the publication of the programme advocated by the General Board of the navy, and when this had been done in the manner already explained, Mr. Wise Wood went to Charles K. Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and put to him the question whether if Congress were ready to appropriate the necessary funds the country would be able to construct all the ships included in it. Mr. Schwab's reply was that not only could the country do this, but that *he alone would undertake to deliver all the*

ships advocated in the original programme of the General Board even to the table service. Mr. Wise Wood then went to the Massachusetts member of the House Naval Affairs Committee and reported the interview to him. This member asked to be connected by telephone with Mr. Schwab, who confirmed the interview, and as a consequence the House programme was greatly enlarged over that advocated by the Administration.

CHAPTER VII

“BROOMSTICK PREPAREDNESS”

Ships voted too late to be of use in war—The President opposes the army experts—Wood condemns the Hay Bill—Secretary Garrison replaced by the pacifist Baker—“Joker” in Hay Bill to rob Wood of Medal of Honor—Henry Ford's attack on the Navy League—Privileged libel on a stupendous scale—The Navy League sues Mr. Ford and wins—Mr. Wilson swings round the circle to advocate mild preparedness—“Weasel” addresses—The crisis of the Republican Convention of 1916—Roosevelt refuses to divide his party—Wood asks Military Affairs Committee for army of four millions—Shows woeful lack of all needed war equipment—The President falters over the armed ship measure—We drift into war—Our explanation is altruism—Mr. Wilson makes his physician a Rear Admiral in the Navy—Wood demoted and the attempt made to shelve him.

THE Navy Bill was not enacted into law until late in the summer of 1916. For reasons already explained, the minority of the House Naval Committee (Republican) in their recommendations somewhat increased the original estimates of the General Board, and even the majority of the committee (Democratic) somewhat increased the estimates of

President Wilson. Of all programmes for naval expansion, the President's was much the smallest and, as already stated, only half that which was declared to be necessary by the most competent board of naval experts in the country.

In the Senate, the Navy Bill as passed by the House was modified in the direction of large increases, and, after long delays in Congress, Mr. Wilson's opposition was withdrawn; whereupon the bill promptly passed in a form providing for a three-year building programme to include ten dreadnaughts and six battle-cruisers. It is well to enforce the lesson that, though our official entry into the war did not come until eight months after the bill was signed, and though the war continued for another nineteen months, none of the capital ships provided in this belated measure had been constructed when hostilities terminated with the signing of the armistice. The reason is clear enough. Steel and workmen were alike in demand for other purposes, and on this account could not be spared—a contingency of the kind that had been predicted by

the advocates of preparedness. As Theodore Roosevelt said eleven years ago, "When once war has broken out it is too late to do anything."

In army legislation, the Administration likewise opposed the recommendations of the trained experts, in this case of the Army General Staff; but it supported instead the vicious plan of the adjutant generals of the National Guard, a plan which called for a so-called "federalization" of the militia, with a dual system of control by States and Federal authorities. General Wood used his influence to defeat this vicious legislation. As he expressed it:

"Such weapons as the Federal Government has must be its weapons and not the weapons of any State nor under even a limited degree of State control. Those who know the State militia and understand and appreciate the handicaps under which it labors, realize that it has done all that could be expected under a fatally defective system, a system which makes a high degree of effi-

ciency impossible. . . . The regular army to-day put under administrative control of forty-eight different governors would soon cease to be a dependable force. The militia should be transferred absolutely to Federal control. . . . In time of emergency we want men and not lawsuits. We want a weapon that is certain and dependable. In my opinion, not less than ninety per cent. and perhaps more of the personnel of the militia want to establish such a condition as I have outlined above.”

The President's failure to support the army experts on the Army Bill brought about the resignation of Mr. Garrison, the Secretary of War, and with him went the excellent Assistant Secretary, Mr. Henry Breckenridge. The place of Mr. Garrison was promptly filled by Newton D. Baker, who shortly before had written to the National Security League that he “was a pacifist and was opposed to the agitation for preparedness.”

For his attitude in opposing the Hay Bill, the unwisdom of whose provisions was soon

to be demonstrated, General Wood was to be punished by robbing him of his Medal of Honor won in the campaign against Apache Indians under Geronimo. This could not, however, be accomplished publicly. A "joker" was introduced into the bill, but for the success of jokers, which are generally introduced during a late stage of conference, it is necessary that they slip through under such vague phrasing that their true character does not appear, or at least is not made public. Publicity in this case effectually disposed of those clauses of the bill which expressed such a mean-spirited hostility to an outspoken public servant.

With the advent of the World War the forces of pacifism gained in Henry Ford, the multimillionaire automobile manufacturer, a recruit whose immense fortune made of him a powerful asset. He devised a clever way of attacking the Navy League in libellous charges concerning its preparedness efforts and one which appeared to be free from the risk that retribution would be exacted by legal process. The speeches of members of Congress being

privileged, Mr. Ford printed as full-page advertisements in newspapers and magazines throughout the country extracts from two violent anti-preparedness speeches by Congressman Tavenner of Illinois. These speeches charged, among other things, that the Navy League was organized by “war traffickers” for profit. The Navy League at once published a refutation of these charges and offered Mr. Ford every opportunity to inspect all their minutes and books. This he refused to do, but in addition to the paid advertisements, which reached many millions of readers, he had two million copies of the libellous charges printed by the Government printer at Mr. Ford’s expense (as is required by law) and had these mailed under Government franks, thus involving a saving to him of some \$20,000.

Since the speech of the Congressman was privileged, the Navy League was without redress from this public defamation unparalleled for magnitude in the history of the country and of the world. By a strange accident, however, the opportunity of reaching Mr.

Ford legally was found. It happened that on May 1st the release by him of one of his full-page advertisements took place two days before the same speech appeared in the Congressional Record. The Navy League thereupon promptly brought suit for libel for \$100,000. Confronted with his charges, Mr. Ford was unable to prove them and took refuge behind the lame excuse that he had believed them to be true. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia thereupon sustained the Navy League in its demurrer.

Mr. Ford had in September, 1915, contributed a million dollars to defeat preparedness, and later he raised his contribution for peace propaganda to ten million dollars. He opposed the loan raised in the United States for the Allies and threatened, according to report, to withdraw his deposit from any banks that contributed to it. He circularized Congress against patriotic songs, preparedness plays, and munition workers. In an interview with Mr. Henry A. Wise Wood he excused the sinking of the *Lusitania*. He had well-known German agents among his advisers and he

decried patriotism and reverence for the flag. In May, 1916, when the Presidential campaign was on, the Democratic National Headquarters announced that Mr. Ford would print advertisements in five hundred newspapers in order to advance Mr. Wilson's campaign for re-election upon the ground that he had “kept us out of war.”

The fight for preparedness was kept up by the defence societies in the face of all these attacks and evidences of opposition, and the spirit of the country was steadily rising to the struggle that lay before it. In the winter of 1915-16, the President in public utterances came out mildly in favor of preparing the national defence, but his utterances were not crystallized into action and they lacked the ring of conviction. The presidential election was to take place in November, 1916, and at the end of the preceding January, Mr. Wilson made a swing around the circle to deliver speeches; but, as in his diplomatic notes, the statements of one address were sometimes found to be nullified by a speech which would be made on the following day.

January 29th at Pittsburgh, the President said:

“When you know that there are combustible materials in the life of the world and in your own national life, and that the sky is full of floating sparks from a great conflagration, are you going to sit down and say it will be time when the fire begins to do something about it? I do not believe that the fire is going to begin, but I would be surer of it if we were ready for the fire.”

At St. Louis he said to a vast throng:

“I am anxious, therefore, my fellow-citizens, that you should look at the hot stuff of war before you touch it; that you should be cool; that you should apply your hard business sense to the proposition. Shall we be caught unawares and do a scientific job like Tyros and Ignoramuses? Or shall we be ready? Shall we know how to do it; shall we do it to the Queen’s taste? I know what the answer of America is, but

I want it to be unmistakably uttered, and I want it to be uttered now. Because, speaking with all solemnity, I assure you that there is not a day to be lost; not, understand me, because of any new or specially critical matter, but because I cannot tell twenty-four hours at a time whether there is going to be trouble or not. . . .

“This month should not go by without something decisive done by the people of the United States by way of preparation of the arms of self-vindication and defence. My heart burns within me, my fellow-citizens, when I think of the importance of this matter and of all that is involved.”

His next sentences appear to have been directed especially at General Wood and Colonel Roosevelt:

“I am sorry that there should be anybody in the United States who goes about crying out for war. There are such men, but they are irresponsible men, who do a great deal of talking, and they are appealing to some

of the most fundamental and dangerous passions of the human heart."

At Des Moines on February 1st he said:

"There are actually men in America who are preaching war, who are preaching the duty of the United States to do what it never would before, seek entanglement in the controversies which have arisen on the other side of the water—abandon its habitual and traditional policy and deliberately engage in the conflict which is now engulfing the rest of the world. I do not know what the standards of citizenship of these gentlemen may be. I only know that I for one cannot subscribe to those standards."

Some two months after the return of Mr. Wilson from his speaking tour, General Wood addressed the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York on "Preparedness for National Defence," in which address he said, "The time has come not only for serious thought; the time has come to do something."

The real crisis of the nation came with the conventions of the Republican and Progressive parties held in Chicago in June, 1916. The Democratic party had already become committed to Woodrow Wilson with his policy of pacifism and “watchful waiting” as a substitute for the facing of issues. The split made in the Republican party in 1912 had not been healed, and resentment of the Progressives was still strong over the ruthless workings of the Republican steam roller as it had operated on that occasion. The preparedness men of all shades were in consequence divided between allegiance to Mr. Roosevelt, who of the men that had been in political life was the most outspoken advocate of preparedness, and a group of others who represented the “old guard” on pre-war issues and were generally in alignment with the elements that had defeated Roosevelt in the convention of 1912. Colonel Roosevelt doubted his ability to secure the nomination of the Republican wing of the party and notified General Wood of his intention to throw his influence to him at the proper moment.

When the "old guard" had triumphed over the Roosevelt forces in the Republican convention and had nominated Justice Hughes, the opportunity had been lost to bring an early victory in Europe by facing our responsibilities as a nation and at once making the preparations which wise foresight would have undertaken two years earlier. Roosevelt, nominated by the Progressive convention, declined to be a wedge dividing his party, threw his support to Justice Hughes, and endeavored to carry the Progressive party with him. The Republican candidate elected to "play safe" on most really vital issues, and in so doing he lost the confidence of a large element in his own party. He was also so badly advised as to antagonize the Progressive wing and to give affront to the strong leader of the Progressive group in California. Inasmuch as Governor Johnson held the destinies of California in his hand, that State returned him by a large majority but threw to Wilson its thirteen electoral votes for President, a number alone sufficient, as was proved, to have elected the Republican candidate had they gone to him.

Thus a second time politics had triumphed over patriotism at a Chicago convention of the dominant party, and the prolongation of the war by at least a year with its frightful toll of life and treasure was the price exacted. It was the slogan, “He kept us out of war,” which made Woodrow Wilson President in a second successful campaign.

But the preparedness men, nothing daunted, kept up the fight with no diminution of ardor. On December 18th, and again in January, 1917, General Wood appeared before the Senate Sub-Committee on Military Affairs sitting with the House Committee on Military Affairs and advocated universal military training. In the first of these hearings, he declared emphatically:

“In conclusion, I wish to emphasize the necessity of prompt preparedness of an adequate force of trained men, with the necessary arms, equipment, and supplies for 4,000,000 men. In my opinion there is nothing of more vital importance than that we should take measures to this end and

take them immediately. We are absolutely unprepared in artillery guns and ammunition for war and will continue to be so for many years under present rate of progress. There is a more or less general misconception of the idea of the universal military training. Many appear to believe that it means large numbers of men standing in uniform—an enormous standing army. It means quite the reverse. It means the maximum number of men trained so that they may be efficient soldiers if needed. Its effect when the system is in full operation will be a relatively small force under arms, but an enormous force of men available in case of necessity—men who are following their normal occupations but with the necessary training to be efficient soldiers if needed.”

Late in February, as he was returning from an inspection trip, General Wood stopped off in Ann Arbor and spoke to an audience of five thousand students, urging upon them the necessity for immediately facing the great

problem of getting the country ready for war. “All the mobile army of the United States,” he said, “can be put into the Yale Bowl and every man find a seat. Not one man in fifty of our citizens can use a high-power rifle”; and he urged the adoption of a modified Swiss system of universal military training, saying that this would be “insurance against war.” Numbers alone did not count. “When was a wolf ever afraid of the size of a flock of sheep?” Gold in itself was a poor weapon; it needed to be stiffened with iron. These were some of the striking bolts from his fighting spirit.

In an address before the students of Stevens Institute at Hoboken delivered March 28, 1917, General Wood startled his hearers by repeating some of the statements which he had felt compelled to make before the Military Affairs Committees. He put these statements in the form of startling questions. He showed that modern guns have their maximum range at near forty-five degrees' elevation, but that our best and most modern coast defence guns, because of their mounting on defective gun carriages, could be elevated only ten degrees;

and that they had further the very serious handicap of a quite limited arc of fire; that the modern guns likely to be brought against them have a calibre exceeding by four inches that of our largest gun; that our one sixteen-inch gun, once the "biggest in the world," though designed for the defence of New York Harbor and though proof-fired thirteen years before, had not yet been mounted; that we had no heavy railroad artillery, indeed none at all with the exception of one 4.7-inch gun and that on an experimental carriage; that we had no single modern airplane engine; no modern high-speed scouting aeroplane; that at the time of the Mexican troubles we had been compelled to buy 350 British machine guns, using British ammunition, for the reason that we had no machine guns of our own; etc. The General then continued: "Every foreign ambassador knows all about our guns." And further:

"Now all these questions relate to preparedness. They relate to preparedness which cannot be bought or hurried very

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greatly. It means organized preparedness; things that are done in time of peace. I have just been giving you a few points. I could go on and greatly amplify this list of questions, and they would all, if they were honestly answered, be answered: ‘We have done nothing, practically nothing.’”

Meanwhile, encouraged by the American Government's failure to follow up its words by acts, the ruthless actions of the German Government continued until by April 1, 1917, 226 American lives had been sacrificed, not including twenty-four children born of foreign parents on American soil. Eventually, American vessels were blockaded by the Germans in our own ports, yet the President still faltered about arming our ships for defence. When the armed ship measure had finally been passed with only a twentieth of the people's representatives in opposition, the President discovered an antiquated law which on a strict construction he believed might stand in the way of action. Said Alexander Hamilton: “The sacred rights of man are not to be

searched for in old documents and musty records. They are written as with a sunbeam in the whole volume of human nature by the hand of divinity itself and can never be erased by mortal power."

And so the nation drifted, but with the spirit of the country more and more aroused, until on April 2, 1917, the President appeared before the joint houses of Congress, and asked for a declaration of war. This transformation was the more remarkable by reason of the fact that he soon made clear we were to enter the war not because Germany had invaded our rights and murdered our citizens until the condition had long become intolerable, but upon the high altruistic ground of saving others while not interested for ourselves. Yet, strangely enough, the declaration of war itself had stated that, "the Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America." And the official explanation by the Administration of our intervention on altruistic motives has been taken up and echoed by a noisy *claque* until

large numbers of our people have become confused. Were this the reason, we should have intervened after the rape of Belgium and northern France—not in April, 1918, after a lapse of two and a half years, during which time civilization had more than once been near annihilation, while we stood by as “innocent bystanders” shielded by the democratic armies of the Allies. Since it was now dangerous to oppose the war, the pacifist element executed a peculiar somersault setting up the cry, “We are for this war in order to end all wars,” a natural prelude to the later craze for internationalism which is now being engineered from the same sources.

On April 6th, by declaration of Congress, we found ourselves not only at war—as we had been for some months—but admitting that a state of war already existed by virtue of Germany’s acts. Two months later Secretary Baker issued an official bulletin (Official War Bulletin of June 7, 1917) in which he admitted the great disorder and confusion of getting things started in his department after the declaration of war, but added, “It is a

happy confusion. I delight in the fact that when we entered this war we were not like our adversary ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and inviting it. Accustomed to peace, we were not ready." In his next annual message the President declared, "We made no preparation for such a contingency. We would have been almost ashamed to prepare for it, as if we were suspicious of ourselves and of our own comrades and neighbors." Mr. George Creel, head of the official press bureau, had also declared to an audience in the city of Washington that he was proud that we had made no preparation for the war. The response was not exactly what he expected, and he thereupon contradicted the reports in the press, explaining that no stenographer had been present and that he had been incorrectly reported. The *New York Times* then pointed out that its stenographer had been present, and the reports were accurate, whereupon Mr. Creel relapsed into silence.

Two significant acts of the President were taken at the solemn moment of making our entry into the war. One of these was fraught

with grave consequences, and both tended to lower at a critical moment the morale of the fighting arms of the service. Both indicated but too clearly that the path to promotion, whether in the army or navy, lay not in meritorious service to the country, but in a complete subservience to the Commander-in-Chief, the political head of the nation.

The much discussed merit system had shortly before been adopted in the navy to replace promotion by seniority alone, a system which smothered initiative and put a premium on strict adherence to service regulations. The one great danger of the new system, and one which was everywhere recognized, was that it left the door wide open to favoritism on the part of superior officers. It was hoped, however, that the spirit of the service would triumph over this weakness. Hardly had the law come into force when the President of the United States elevated his personal physician, Lieutenant Cary T. Grayson, to the rank and pay of a rear-admiral in the navy. Of this appointment *Sea Power*, the organ of the Navy League, said editorially:

“Let us discuss frankly the case of Dr. Grayson. He entered the service in 1904, and after twelve years of duty, of which perhaps the most arduous has been carrying the White House shawl strap, he is promoted to the rank of rear admiral with all the pay and emoluments which go with that honored rank usually conferred as a reward for long and worthy service.

“He is jumped over the heads of men who have done their legitimate duty on ships and in the fever fens of the tropics. He passes over 130 of these and is given a life position with a higher permanent rank than was ever before reached by a doctor in the history of the navy . . . the whole thing is an indecency that is resented by the entire navy and by all decent men who know the facts.”

Is there, perhaps, a connection between the hostility which was thereafter shown by the Secretary of the Navy toward the Navy League? By order of the Secretary, members of the League were forbidden entrance to

naval stations, the comfort kits which were such a godsend to the sailors, were refused by the Department.

Confirmation by the Senate of the appointment of Grayson was held up and died with the outgoing Congress. It was hoped that the President would see fit not to present it again after the new Congress had convened, but he refused to recede even under a fierce fire of criticism, and the appointment, more or less lost sight of amid the welter of vital war measures that soon supervened, was at last confirmed.

On March 25th, scarcely a week before the President appeared before the joint houses of Congress to ask for a declaration of war against Germany, the country was treated to a sensation when it was announced that the Department of the East, commanded by General Wood, had been broken up into three parts, that the two larger sections had already been placed under the command of his juniors, and that he had been given the option of exile at Manila or Hawaii or of taking command of the new and relatively unimportant South-

eastern Department, with headquarters at Charleston, South Carolina. He chose the latter post as a storm of protest was going up at this attempt to side-track him. Senator John W. Weeks, a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, a veteran of the Spanish-American War, and a man thoroughly familiar with the military situation, gave out in an interview:

“In due time those responsible for weakening our military organization at such a time as this will have to explain the reason for doing this. In the meantime those competent to judge will have one opinion, that it is a pernicious piece of party politics.”

Ex-President Taft afterwards referred to this sensational demotion of a great American soldier as follows:

“The public supposed that General Wood would be consulted and given an important place in the organization of the army.

Instead he was relieved from duty at Governor's Island and sent to Charleston. It is now known that this was personally directed by the Commander-in-Chief, probably for the purpose of indicating displeasure of General Wood's criticism of the policy of non-preparation."

Speaking of Wood's campaigning for defence of the nation and its punishment, the *Scientific American*, always well informed concerning the army and navy, said editorially:

"It took no little courage to do this at a time when the Administration regarded even the mention of military preparation as a breach of that neutrality 'even in thought' which it was enjoining upon the American people.

"The event has proved that Wood was right.

"It was the confident expectation that the soldier who had so nobly jeopardized his career for the sake of his country would be called at once into the intimate counsels

of the Administration now that the crisis which he foretold had actually come upon us. An able, far-sighted, and highly experienced general, such as he, who holds also the affection and unbounded confidence of his fellow-citizens, is surely, at such an hour as this, a most valuable asset to his country. And we take it that no other questions than those of his record and his proved ability should determine the degree of his employment.

“Hence it came about that, when in the same breath in which it was announced that we were at war, we were told that our highest ranking officer, the very soldier who had labored to awaken the country to the imminence of that war, had been removed to a minor command,—the country simply stood aghast.”

John Jay Chapman in a communication to the *New York Times*, said:

“Perhaps nothing that President Wilson could have done would so have shaken public confidence.

“General Wood is the author and embodiment of the country’s present mood. . . .

“General Wood is the man of the hour.

“For the Administration in the present crisis to throw away its greatest asset in the way of popular confidence has cast into many minds a doubt as to whether the Administration is in earnest about the war. To blanket General Wood is the first thing an anti-war party would have done if it had come into power. . . .

“It would seem, at any rate, as if this slight to General Wood must tend to increase his importance by focusing upon him the gratitude and admiration of every American who has watched his course.”

CHAPTER VIII

AT WAR

Rise of the war spirit upon entering the war—"The President's War"—General Wood recommends calling of reserve officers—Is excluded from counsels with the Allied Missions—Wood receives ovations in Southern cities—He is again demoted and assigned to command at Camp Funston—We borrow our war equipment from the Allies—Wood's recommendation concerning machine guns is turned down—Investigation of War Department by Military Affairs Committee—Senator Chamberlain given the lie by the President—The airplane scandal—Wood's report on lack of air control at front—The Emergency Fleet Corporation—The Army Supply System—Anxiety during the winter of 1917-18—Mr. Baker predicts five hundred thousand men will be in France "early" in 1918—General Wood goes to France—He is wounded—After discharge from hospital reaches New York as German drive opens—Makes startling statements before Military Affairs Committee—Found fit for field service by Medical Board—Britain's desperate appeal to America for troops—The "Transport Miracle"—Ex-President Roosevelt cited on War Department breakdown.

As soon as the opportunity was afforded by the action of the Administration, the country forgot at once all political differences, as well as its discontent over official dilatory tactics. It now promptly rallied behind the President

and gave him a whole-hearted support in the tasks which lay before him. Even before the declaration of war, Senator Lodge, the Republican leader in the Senate, had pledged the Administration the unfailing support of his party in all war measures, and it is now pleasant to recall that Senator John Sharp Williams, the Democratic leader, declared on the same floor after hostilities had terminated, that Republicans had supported the President on all war measures better than had the members of his own political party. Mr. Roosevelt, the most outspoken critic of the Administration, went to Washington to call upon the President and offer him his hearty support.

The support of the people was no less strong and ready than that of its leaders in Congress. The draft, which now became absolutely necessary, was accepted, not under protest, but as a patriotic duty and privilege. History does not recall another such example, and it is to the eternal credit of Leonard Wood and Theodore Roosevelt and the defence societies that this astounding elevation of the country's morale had been accomplished in the face

of administrative disapproval. All the huge war loans and all Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., and other war subscriptions, were promptly over-subscribed.

History must, however, record as one of the strange and inexplicable facts of the situation that in the prodigious task and responsibility which now was laid upon him, the President chose to put personal politics above patriotism, to look upon all his former critics as enemies, to repel the support of the country as a whole; and, unlike any of the leaders of the Allied Powers, to conduct America's war effort as a personal, rather than as a national, undertaking. He chose not to recognize the offer of support tendered by the Republican leaders, he would advise with none but his own political henchmen, even ignoring those patriotic and loyal Democrats like Senator Chamberlain, who had long advocated preparedness; and, until their incompetence began to threaten popular support, the President filled all important posts with trusted political followers.

In the inspired biography of Colonel House,

THE KANSAS CITY STAR

E OF
ROOSEVELT

NEW YORK OFFICE
317 MADISON AVENUE

December 28th, 1918.

Dear Leonard:

Is it true that officers at Camp
Funston have been discharged because of their
activities against conscientious objectors?

I have had a rather severe attack of
inflammatory rheumatism, but am on the high road
to recovery.

Always yours,

T. R.

Major-General Leonard Wood,
Camp Funston, Kansas.

One of the last letters written by Theodore Roosevelt. This shows that
he looked forward to early recovery. Nine days later he
passed from life as he lay asleep

scrupulously revised after its first publication in the press, we read:

“From the very start he [Col. House] knew that there were just two ways in which the war could be won: By outmatching Germany’s astonishing achievements in co-ordination of national effort and by attacking Germany and Austria from within. He thoroughly agreed with Mr. Wilson that American political institutions would not lend themselves to such departures from national custom as the erection of a Coalition Cabinet. . . . He held, with the President, that the extraordinary amount of responsibility entrusted under the Constitution to the President, made it incumbent upon the Chief Executive to have the support of men of his own party. . . . To him will go the credit for victory, or the obloquy of defeat. . . .

“No, a Coalition Cabinet was rejected by Colonel House’s evenly balanced mind. The idea had advantages, but they were advantages which spring from playing to

the galleries. The announcement of such a step would be hailed by all sections of the country as a mark of disinterestedness, a proof of non-partisanship. But what would such tributes avail if the war engine were slowed up? . . . Successful administration depends to a great degree upon complete unity in policy—which requires unity in thought. The President was convinced that in a situation so fraught with delicate questions and with the great objects he had set himself to attain, it was more than ever necessary for him to have the support of men who saw with him eye to eye.”

General Wood remained still for some weeks in command of the department of the East, which embraced the entire Atlantic Seaboard, and was charged with the inspection of more than half of the National Guard of the country. He was therefore in a position where he might accomplish much in pushing the national defence, and he set himself to work with his usual energy and foresight. Almost immediately, he recommended to Secretary Baker that the

Reserve Corps, comprising from 800 to 900 officers, largely resident within his department, should be called for intensive training and placed in two camps to be located one in the North and the other in the Southern district; and, further, that the sea-coast fortifications be utilized for the training of suitably qualified young men, making use for their equipment of the old type of Springfield and the Krag-Jorgensen rifles.

On America's intervention in the war, Great Britain and France, and later Italy and other Allied nations, dispatched to Washington important missions composed of the most distinguished men, so as to acquaint the American Government with the desperateness of the military situation for the Allies, the need of the utmost haste in making its force felt without a moment of unnecessary delay, and also, if possible, to prevent a repetition of those costly mistakes into which they had fallen. Not only were these lessons of experience frankly confessed, but late military knowledge and war secrets were generously communicated by military and naval experts

who at once went into conference with those of our own services. As the ranking general of the army and the military head of its most important department, it was the duty of General Wood, until his transfer should become effective, to receive officially these august missions, which included such statesmen as Balfour and such military chieftains as Joffre, and to accompany them to the National Capital. The studied affronts which were there perpetrated in excluding him from the military councils which took place, as well as from social functions, not unnaturally led members of the missions, quite without intent of offering offence, to ask questions no less embarrassing to the Administration than they were to General Wood.

On the General's arrival at his new post at Charleston, the Southern people turned out *en masse* and received him with public acclamation. It was his duty to travel about his department for the purpose of making inspection as well as to select the sites for cantonments of the new National Army, and this tour of duty soon resolved itself into a

series of great ovations. In each city that he visited he was met by delegations of citizens, and at Atlanta and Little Rock audiences of sixty thousand people gathered to see and hear him. His addresses made no reference to the recent unpleasant incident in his career, but were devoted to spurring the people to the utmost effort in order to win the war.

After but three months as Commander of the Southeastern Department, another attempt was made to side-track General Wood, and this time by transfer to the command of the military cantonment located at Camp Funston in Kansas. On arriving at this post there was again a great outpouring of citizens to receive and welcome him. Here, as commander of the post, it became his duty without formal orders to train the 89th Division of the National Army which was assembling there, and his phenomenal success as an effective and inspiring commander was here to be strikingly demonstrated.

The primary needs of our armies in the way of equipment were service rifles, both light and heavy machine guns, light and heavy field

artillery, airplanes (especially combat planes), tanks, uniforms, shoes, blankets, etc.; and, in order to get them overseas, ships. The failure to secure these, or in other instances to get them within a reasonable time, was due in some cases quite as much to wrong-headed decisions on vital issues, as it was to dilatory tactics and incompetence. It was nineteen months from the date of our intervention in the war to the signing of the armistice, yet we had to rely upon France and Great Britain for almost our entire equipment outside of service rifles and uniforms. This decision to borrow rather than to manufacture our equipment had been absolutely necessary in order that we should take part in the war at all, notwithstanding the fact that the French Government in the matter of artillery was terribly handicapped at the moment by the necessity of replacing the 2500 to 3000 pieces of artillery which had been lost to Italy in the terrible Caporetto disaster. The decision involved for France the retaining of much of her trained man-power behind the lines.

The Lewis machine gun, the invention of an

American army officer adopted by Great Britain with such success, was at the time of our entry into the war available for quantity production in the United States. This gun had been tested and highly approved as a suitable light machine gun by a Board appointed for the purpose by General Wood. The inventor, Colonel Lewis, had however criticised the coast-gun carriages that had been invented by the head of the Ordnance Bureau and supplied to our coast fortifications; and he was as a consequence in disfavor with the chief. Whether or not because of this disapproval, the Lewis gun was rejected and the War Department began to experiment for both light and heavy machine guns. The result was the official approval of the modified Colt weapons which became known as Browning machine guns, but after seventeen months of delay the department was unable to supply them in sufficient quantity. The direct consequence was that the American Expeditionary Force had to be equipped with the inferior *Chauchat* machine gun, which employed an ammunition different from our service rifle ammunition,

with resulting large difficulties for the supply department. The reason assigned for this costly error in the War Department's history of its effort (*The War with Germany*), is that because the Brownings possessed such superiority over any other machine guns in use by any army, the Germans might conceivably capture one, rapidly manufacture it in sufficient quantities to supply their armies and so take away our advantage—we took seventeen months to get a very moderate number of pieces ready. This official report goes on to say: "Production of all the types (of machine guns) *was pressed and the advantages of preparedness illustrated.*" Again, speaking of the men that could have been equipped with machine guns (but were not) the report says: "In fact this [non] production was one of the striking features of our war effort. It would have resulted, *if the fighting had been prolonged*, in a greatly increased volume of fire on the part of the American troops." (The italics are ours in both instances.)

The Senate Military Affairs Committee, of which Senator Chamberlain was chairman,

undertook an investigation of the War Department during the winter of 1917-18, and after six weeks listening to testimony concerning the confusion and incompetence which were being displayed. Thoroughly disheartened and worn out, he declared at a banquet of the National Security League in New York on January 19, 1918, that, "the Government has fallen down on war work because of inefficiency in every bureau and department." A day or two later the President retorted, "Senator Chamberlain's statement as to the present inaction and ineffectiveness of the Government is an astonishing and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth."

There have been few finer patriots or more valiant advocates of preparedness than the Democratic senator from Oregon, and the question will arise in many minds whether after sitting for six weeks listening to testimony concerning the work of the War Department he was not better informed upon the subject than was the President of the United States. Senator Chamberlain admitted that "every bureau and department" used in his

statements was too sweeping, but he thereupon proceeded to present some of the startling facts elicited by his committee and followed it by proposing the formation of a war cabinet with representatives from Congress. This the President stubbornly opposed, and he succeeded in defeating it; but the net result of the incident was a really serious waking up within the War Department, and for this Senator Chamberlain is entitled to the credit.

The investigation of the airplane scandal, which after much opposition was at last ordered, showed that almost the entire appropriation of \$640,000,000 had been wasted. In accord with the War Department's habitual policy, a plan to construct twenty-two thousand planes to be used in the campaign of 1918 had been widely advertised throughout the country by the official press bureau, and the Secretary of War gave out frequent rosy reports of progress, as, for example, the one in February, 1918, that the "peak of production" would soon be reached. In so far as the vitally essential combat planes were concerned, our effort along this line was practically negligible

up to the signing of the armistice. The defective combat planes which in small numbers were supplied at the front have been declared responsible for the deaths of some of our best aviators.

Returning from inspection of the American front just previous to the German drive of March, 1918, General Wood reported officially:

“So far as can be learned the Germans have taken our promised aerial fleet as one which is going to appear in the battle areas as scheduled and have built to meet it. The American fighting aeroplane is as yet stranger to the battlefields of Europe and our aviation service is thus far pathetically unprepared. The American Division which I visited was without any air service other than that furnished by the French, which latter was limited in character because of demands on their own front. German planes came at will over our lines and on one of the days that I was with General Bullard's Division, a German plane engaged in photographic work came down so close to the

ground that our men were firing at it with revolvers. Our failure to provide aeroplanes and to live up to the schedule which was expected of us has been a cause of bitter disappointment and no small amount of embarrassment, and, as I said above, the enemy has taken our statements very seriously and prepared to meet them effectively."

The ships which were so badly needed to transport our men and supplies abroad did not materialize. To head the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the President called the distinguished builder of the Panama Canal, but he made all the decisions of General Goethals subject to approval by an admiralty lawyer from San Francisco who was at the head of the Shipping Board. The public at last became exasperated when two vitally important months had been squandered in a deadlock within this double-headed organization, a difficulty which the President delayed to remedy. General Goethals wisely opposed the granting of almost unlimited contracts upon



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General Wood in 1918

the vicious "cost plus" system with its encouragement of inefficiency, as he did the large scale construction of obsolete types of wooden ships; and his wisdom has since been confirmed by our experience in constructing these almost worthless vessels.

In discussing the equipment of the American Expeditionary Force, the War Department's official report (*The War with Germany*) says: "The army in France always had sufficient food and clothing." Captain Archie Roosevelt commanded a company in the famous First American Division, a division which had nearly 100 per cent. of casualties. He reports that his men were without suitable shoes during hard campaigning, and that after all attempts to secure them through official channels had failed, he wrote home and obtained them promptly. His wife and his father acting together bought and sent to his command at their own expense 250 pairs of shoes which arrived at a critical time. He says:

"To refute the deliberate lies put forth by those who wish to show what their efforts

accomplished, I will list some of the supplies of our division when in the trenches nine months after we had declared war with Germany. It can be seen from General Pershing's report that the condition was but little improved in November, 1918, after we had been in the war one year and seven months."

He then states that the shoes, uniforms, caps, helmets, gas-masks, rifles and pack equipment, auto rifles and machine guns, grenades, mortars and mortar ammunition, signal equipment (with instructions in French), field artillery and its ammunition, ration carts and wagons, artillery horses, and aeroplanes had practically all been supplied from other than American sources, and that some were good and others bad. He then goes on to say:

"In the United States, those conducting the war never had to face facts. They dwelt in the realm of fancy. On the other side Pershing was faced with the total annihilation of his forces and lasting dis-

grace to the United States and himself. The situation was such as to bring out the best in every decent man. I believe that even the small minded politicians and staff officers in the United States, if they had been fighting in Europe, would have soon found out that mere lying statements about things which never existed gave no results in the fighting line."

The ships constructed by the Emergency Fleet Corporation, even though it was eventually taken over by that genius of construction, Mr. Schwab, played but a subordinate rôle in our troop transport. Half of our troops were transported to Europe by Great Britain, others in French and Italian vessels, and so far as carried in ships under American control, these were very largely the formerly interned German and Austrian vessels which had been taken over, and the Dutch ships which had to be seized in the emergency.

In January, 1917, nearly three months before our entry into the war, General Wood in a hearing before the Joint Military Affairs

Committees of Congress had urged the raising at once of an army of four million men with its full equipment in rifles, artillery, etc. No heed was paid by the War Department to this warning.

The military campaigns of 1917 closed with a most discouraging outlook for the Allied Powers, and with America's powerful aid now assured for the future it was certain that Germany would strike with all her force in a desperate drive at the beginning of the season of 1918. Anxiety was intense throughout the preceding winter. Congressman, afterward Senator, Medill McCormick, who had gone to Europe for the purpose of obtaining first-hand knowledge of the situation, was told by Premier Lloyd George that "America was not using its big men in the war," and inquired what had happened to General Wood. He said he would like to see General Wood in the Allied War Council.

The Senate Military Affairs Committee had the Secretary of War on the stand, to state, among other things, how large an American army he was assured of having ready in Europe

at the opening of the campaign of 1918. Mr. Baker gave the committee assurance that "early" in 1918—Senator Weeks states that to him he gave the date as February 15th—he expected to have five hundred thousand men in France. The committee expressed its scepticism, appearing to have the same degree of faith in this statement as in the rosy forecast concerning the aeroplane fleet that was to smother the German army.

General Wood had now about completed the training of the 89th Division of the National Army, and, like other prospective division commanders to be ordered for field service, he was sent to France to first become acquainted with conditions at the front. He inspected the British, French, and American fronts and was, by the Allied generals and statesmen, shown courtesies in keeping with his rank and his record as a soldier.

On January 27th, while at Fère-en-Tardenois in the company of a number of French and American officers, Wood was watching the work of a French mortar being operated by a French crew. The shell detonated inside the

gun blowing the latter to pieces. The gun crew and eighty per cent. of the party watching it were either killed or wounded. The four officers on either side of General Wood were killed outright. Six fragments of metal passed through the General's clothing, tore off a portion of his sleeve, and two of these fragments killed the officers on either side of him. A fragment passed through the thick biceps of the General's left arm and lodged in the armpit. He was the only man within twelve feet of the gun who was not killed outright. His wound was dressed in the field hospital, and the next day he motored to Paris to be treated in the French officers' hospital in the Hotel Ritz, from which he was discharged in three weeks—an evidence of his excellent physical condition.

On General Wood's return to New York in March, in accordance with custom where officers are to be given command in the field, he was called before a medical board for a special physical examination to determine his fitness for field service. The board was a distinguished one and included Dr. Billings and

Dr. Charles Mayo, the celebrated Rochester physician. Wood was by this board pronounced entirely fit for field service. This fact is of interest, because a whispering propaganda was later widely circulated that the reason for detaching him from his command on the eve of its departure for the front was physical unfitness. It might here be added that he successfully passed another physical examination before a different medical board in the late fall of 1918, just before the 10th Division was expected to sail for the front.

What General Wood had seen of the critical situation at the Western front, and of the preparations being made by Germany to overwhelm the Allied armies, made it his duty to acquaint the American Government with this alarming situation. Of the five hundred thousand men who, as Secretary Baker had assured the Military Affairs Committee, would be at the front at this time, there were actually but four divisions or about one hundred thousand men in the trenches. Arriving in Washington, Wood found at the War Department confusion combined with apparent content-

ment and his attempt to see the Commander-in-Chief was rebuffed. He was, however, promptly summoned before the Military Affairs Committee, and his frankly told story did much to instill life into the War Department.

The expected German drive was launched on March 21st as General Wood was before the Military Affairs Committee. Tearing through the Allied lines in Picardy for an advance of some thirty miles, the German forces were at last halted by French reserves despatched by Foch just as the Paris-Calais life-line had been cut near Amiens, and that great city brought under long-range fire. Halted here, another push was made by the Germans in the Flanders section which so overwhelmed the British armies that General Haig announced that his army "had its back to the wall." The suspense was terrible and civilization came nearer to collapse than at any other time in the history of the war. But again French reserves were able to reach the critical area at the last moment, and the Germans were finally halted upon the slopes of Mt. Kemmel.

After the debacle of March 21st, in which the British Fifth Army had been routed in Picardy, Lloyd George sent a desperate appeal to President Wilson to get the American troops over. The answer of the President came promptly, in which he promised to do this if Great Britain "would carry her share." In this crisis British ships were pulled out of the trades, thus robbing the island nation of two hundred thousand tons of essential cargoes and holding up shipments of perishable supplies from many of the British colonies. The result of this great sacrifice on the part of Great Britain was that one million Americans—sixty per cent. or more of them American troops—had reached France by Independence Day. On this date President Wilson and Secretary Baker both issued congratulatory messages to the American people upon the achievement of "this transport miracle"; but neither of them mentioned in his message the part of Great Britain in the "miracle."

Furthermore, the War Department's explanation of its conduct of the war (*The War with Germany*), written by Colonel Ayres and

published in 1919, belittled the part of Great Britain in the transportation of our troops overseas. In a defence of this report against attack Colonel Ayres said (Boston *Evening Transcript* of September 3, 1919): "The fact is that the British shipping used in the spring of 1918 did not consist of cargo ships but almost entirely of passenger liners which the British were glad to operate at the prices we paid and in which they reserved for themselves the cargo space."

It is important that the American public should know the stark truth concerning what Great Britain's supreme sacrifice was in this crisis of civilization. Sir Joseph Maclay, the British shipping controller, has fortunately supplied us with the facts. These were given out in an interview which was published in the *New York Times* of August 4, 1918. Somewhat abridged, his statements are as follows:

"On the average about sixty per cent. of the American troops have been carried in British ships, and, as I will explain later on, the proportion is steadily rising. . . .

“After the German offensive opened in March, we had to make a big effort. I may add that of the 638,000 troops carried in the months of April, May, and June, 331,000 were accommodated in British ships. . . .

“We are working to promote a common cause, and we are not patting ourselves on the back for what we are doing. But I might add, since the fact may not be well known, that we are only able to face these new responsibilities by sacrificing for the time, not only British, but imperial interests.

“Ships which under the normal conditions were engaged in the trade between the British Islands and the Far East, Australia and India, have had to be withdrawn from service, and we have been compelled to sacrifice to a very large extent the communications between the mother country and the Dominions. Of the manner in which the people of the Dominions have bowed to the compelling circumstances, it has been really splendid, but there is more in it even than that.

“This concentration of shipping has

meant the severing of trade associations built up during long periods of years. Every business man well understands the character of that sacrifice, for there is no saying when those abandoned services can be resumed. That statement may suggest the character of the sacrifice which the British people are making in order to facilitate the movement of American troops."

In his testimony before the Military Affairs Committee at the hearing of December 18, 1916, General Wood had set forth the urgent need of training and equipping without delay an army of four million men. On his return from the front in March, 1918, he urged this again with even greater insistence, now making the figure five million instead of four million. Lieutenant General Young, ex-Presidents Roosevelt and Taft, and others who knew the terrible need, echoed this warning. Says ex-President Roosevelt, writing in the fall of 1918:

"When last March General Wood and General Young and Mr. Taft and the pres-

ent writer asked for the immediate raising of an army of five million troops (we meant fighting soldiers, and not an alloy of forty per cent. of non-combatants) our purpose was not rhetorical. But to President Wilson the matter seemed primarily one of competitive rhetoric. Obviously he felt uneasy about the proposal and treated it as one which could be deftly put aside by adroit use of language. Accordingly, with marked histrionic effect, he asked, 'why limit the army' to the five million we proposed, and announced that he wished an army 'without limit.' This was highly satisfactory as rhetoric. But the action of the President, taken through his Secretary of War, showed that it was merely rhetoric. The phrase was an 'army without limit'; the fact was that the army was fixed at a much lower limit than that which we had asked, and was thus fixed six months after we urged immediate action. Secretary Baker did not set himself to meet our greatest military need of to-day, which is a thorough mobilization of our whole man-

power for service in our armies and in our war industries. He set himself to prevent the meeting of this need. Congress last spring made ready to go ahead with the 'fight or work' plan. But Mr. Baker, acting for the President, intervened. He asked for delay, for procrastination, and of course thereby paralyzed Congressional action. He protested against the enlargement of the draft-age limits. He protested against planning more than a few months in advance. He said that we were 'many months ahead of our original hope in regard to the transportation of men' overseas; but he omitted to add that this was because the original plans were hopelessly inadequate.

"Never in our history has there been more fatuous incompetence than that displayed, alike in plan and action, by the War Department during the first nine months after we entered the war.

"It was Ludendorff who effectively revised the plans of President Wilson and Secretary Baker.

“Then the English lent us ships, and we really began to send men abroad, until we had perhaps a million soldiers and over half as many non-combatants across. We actually did what we ought to have done, and by the exercise of moderate efficiency would have done, just one year previously. But in June the drive for the time being halted, and immediately Mr. Baker proposed a reversion to our former Rip Van Winkle slumber. . . .

“Nor is it only our army as to which there is now failure to provide for the future. The same is true for the navy. During the first six months of the war the navy was almost as badly handled as the army, and it has not yet recovered from its complete mismanagement during the previous four years. Four years ago, Admiral Bradley Fiske dared to tell the truth about naval conditions. He thereby rendered a very great service to the country, and for doing this the authorities punished him, exactly as Wood was punished for similar truth-telling; and thereby in both cases they

served notice on the best men in the army and navy that they jeopardized their careers if they told the truth in the interest of our people as a whole."

CHAPTER IX

A SOLDIER'S REWARD

Attempt to shelve General Wood on the eve of his departure for the front—Angry protests from the public, the press, and from leading men—Wood's parting address to his men—Whispering propaganda that order was given because of the General's physical unfitness—The 10th Division trained in record time—A military review at Camp Funston—The ideals of a Christian soldier—Putting the division to school at the signing of the armistice—The Government's tardy change of attitude towards General Wood—Wood's part in the success of the American doughboy in France—The General's real reward.

They took counsel to humble his soldier's pride
By holding him back from the goal.
But he pressed his lips, and he tempered his men
In the flame of his dauntless soul.

Glory and guerdon to him who sent
His spirit to France and the Rhine
In the fighting host that he trained and loved—
First soldier of the line!

HARRY TORSEY BAKER.

LATE in May of 1918, the crack 89th Division of the National Army—a division which later made an enviable reputation at the

front—had completed its training under General Wood at Camp Funston and received orders to entrain for the port of embarkation. Its commander, who had had his tour of inspection at the front and had passed successfully his special examination for field service, thereupon disposed of his saddle horses and made all his arrangements with reference to a long tour of service in France.

Arriving in New York City, the port of embarkation, General Wood was handed a telegraphic order from the War Department which detached him from his command and assigned him to duty at the Presidio, the deserted military post at San Francisco. The dispatch contained no explanation whatever of the reason for issuing it, and none has since been furnished. What this sudden blow meant to a fighting soldier like General Wood few will ever know, for with stoical determination he does not talk of it, though he did ask the Administration to rescind the order.

If the country had been shocked at the treatment of General Wood at the time of our entering the war—when his department had

been broken up without consulting him and the attempt made to shelve him at a remote post in the Pacific—it was now fairly stupefied. Even the New York *World*, the Administration organ, said that it “will give every fair-minded man a bad taste in the mouth.” The pro-Administration Brooklyn *Eagle* attempted to make out that this action had been taken because General Pershing did not want to have General Wood as a subordinate; that the “order came as a complete surprise to the President,” and they hoped some staff officer would be rapped over the knuckles for “having issued such an order without consulting the President.” The idea that any staff officer would have ventured to issue such an order without the knowledge of the President was, of course, too absurd for serious consideration.

Ex-President Taft said in the Philadelphia *Ledger* :

“The country is seriously disappointed that General Wood has not been permitted to go abroad with the division which he has

ernment did not wish to hear. The President declined to receive him. The Senate Military Affairs Committee summoned him and he made the Capitol corridors ring."

Senator Johnson of California, speaking on the floor of the United States Senate, declared that this act of the President "illustrates the extent which we have gone in transmuting this democracy into an autocracy."

It was necessary for General Wood to say a word at the time of taking leave of his division. It is simple and straightforward, without complaint or recrimination, but it does not entirely hide the anguish at his disappointment of his hope:

"I will not say good-bye, but consider it a temporary separation—at least I hope so. I have worked hard with you and you have done excellent work. I had hoped very much to take you over to the other side. In fact, I had no intimation, direct or indirect, of any change of orders until we reached here the other night. The orders

have been changed and I am to go back to Funston. I leave for that place to-morrow morning. I wish you the best of luck and ask you to keep up the high standard of conduct and the work you have maintained in the past. The orders stand: and the only thing to do is to do the best we can—all of us—to win the war. That is what we are here for. That is what you have been trained for. I shall follow your career with the greatest interest—with just as much interest as though I were with you. Good luck: and God bless you!”

The 89th or “Leonard Wood Division” now rechristened itself the “Orphan Division,” and it paid the greatest possible tribute to its leader in the enviable record it made at the front as a splendidly trained fighting division.

An angry resentment found voice from one end of the country to the other over this punishment of a great soldier for putting his country’s dire need before his own personal fortunes. This note was so strong and insistent that the army orders were modified to

the extent that General Wood, instead of being shelved at the Presidio, was allowed to go back to Camp Funston and exercise his unusual skill in training another division. The General's motto is, "Do things but don't talk about them."

The official press bureau now began to throw out suggestions that General Wood was being held for an important post at the front—to command an army in Italy, in Siberia, etc. The earlier rumors of like nature having been shown to be false, these echoes were apparently not taken very seriously by the public. The whispering propaganda, however, which was carried throughout the country to the effect that General Wood was physically unfit for field service and that this was the real reason why he had not been allowed to go to the front, gained wide currency and was no doubt confirmed in the popular mind by Secretary Baker's statement before the Military Affairs Committee that the order had been issued "for military reasons."

When General Wood arrived at Camp Funston the new 10th Division was just arriving

at the camp. It was of course anxious to complete its training in time to reach the front and get into the fighting before hostilities should cease, as it was already evident that Foch was fast driving the Huns out of France. The General endeavored to meet this laudable ambition, and his success in whipping this body of recruits into shape is probably without a parallel in our army service, if it is in the history of any army. The first men of the division had begun to organize into groups on August 10th. They were prepared and trained ready to leave for the front on November 1st, less than three months later, and the six officers of the British and French Service Mission, which had arrived in the middle of September and been with the division for six weeks, as a result of a critical examination, declared the 10th Division to be the best prepared and best trained of any that they had seen in the United States.

On August 24th, a divisional parade was planned and the people of Kansas posted themselves on the hills of the military reservation to observe the result. Long before day-

light, the reservation had been closed to traffic and nearly 30,000 men with long lines of transportation, artillery, etc., began to move out. Each unit had its schedule requiring that it pass a certain point at a certain time; and a staff officer present has reported "that it was a more or less unexpected but a very agreeable surprise to note that the last unit swung into line and came to rest on the review field exactly on the minute set for the commencement of the review proper." He adds:

"The review was really a wonderful demonstration of the General's ability as an organizer and leader. Military men who understand the difficulties of such an organization looked upon it as nothing short of marvellous. A number of the French and British officers, who have seen fighting on the other side, were especially loud in their praise."

The soldier who gets his training under General Wood learns, however, something besides tactics; he gets sound advice to guide him in

the struggle ahead. In a talk to the men of the 10th Division on September 12th, the General said:

“You are going over there. So live that you go over clean and sound. Take care of yourselves, get into the best possible condition. You will feel a lot better when you come up against death some day if you have been a clean and decent man, don't forget that. The mucker isn't a good soldier. He may make a good impetuous fighter in a moment of excitement, but he will not in the trenches or along the line. There is a religion of the trenches over there. It is founded on doing your duty and saying mighty little, keeping clean, obeying orders, and being on the job. That is the soldier's religion over there: duty—come what may. . . .

“Respect your uniform. Do not take it where you would not take the women of your own family. It is the uniform of your country, thousands of our men have died in it. Keep it clean, don't dishonor it by taking it where you would be ashamed

to take your mother, your wife, or your sister.

“There has never been a time when moral force has been more important than in this war. The old romance of war is gone; no more of the three or four days' hard fighting, something accomplished, and then a rest, but it is just hammer away all the time and the fellow that can smile last is the one who is going to win. It is a struggle requiring character and determination. We want the kind of soldier that Cromwell describes. 'A God-fearing man well spoken of by the people.' That is the kind of soldier we need. And it is the kind of soldier we are getting now, for we are a Christian people and our new army is the people in arms.

“You are giving everything, you are offering everything you have, including life itself, to win this war. You typify, your arms typify, all that is best in the tradition of soldiers; the man that goes out to give everything that others may live, that right may prevail—man can do nothing finer. . . .

“A real soldier tells little of what he has

done and never brags of what he is going to do. Be modest. Now you are going into France, probably, or into Belgium. You are going to live in the houses, in the villages, towns, crowd the streets, of the people who have been fighting our battle—mind you, our battle—for four years. Don't go as braggarts go, go as gentlemen; a real soldier is always a gentleman. Be modest, quiet, observant of the traditions of these people, careful of their feelings. The dead and permanently crippled of France in this war number two million of men. That is France's contribution to the war. England's is about the same. Do you know what that means? A column of squads well closed up that reaches more than across the whole State of Kansas, and would take seven days and five hours for them to pass you at an ordinary marching gait. I refer to the French alone. Those are the dead and permanently crippled alone. Now, when you come into their land do not say, 'We have come to win the war.' Simply say, 'We have come over to

help you win the war,' and if we do as well as they have done we shall reflect honor upon our country, our army, and our flag. . . .

“And now another word to the officers. . . . There is nothing that so quickly disturbs morale, good purpose, and that spirit of loyalty on the part of men to their officers as an arbitrary exercise of unreasonable authority. In other words, remember your men are human beings, and remember something else, if you destroy a man's self-respect you absolutely destroy him as a soldier and you might as well send him back home. You have got to preserve a man's self-respect if he is to maintain a respect for you and that kind of loyalty which comes from confidence in you. Let the men realize that you are their best friend, that the authority you exercise is for their well-being, and you will have no trouble.”

When, on November 11th, hostilities had been prematurely ended by the signing of the armistice—with an unconditional surrender

already reflected in the military situation, in Foch's intended drive, in Germany's bitter wails, as well as in a new crop of diplomatic notes—there was the danger that with the supreme test for which the men in the ranks had been steeling themselves now suddenly removed, there would be a sudden drop in morale.

Most of the men at Funston were farmers, and General Wood at once carried out arrangements with the Kansas Agricultural College, located a few miles only from the camp, for a course of instruction for the soldiers in such branches of agricultural work as stock-raising, land fertilization, etc. In addition, it was arranged to take three hundred men into the workshops and laboratories for instruction in mechanical engineering. At the camp itself the mornings only were given over to military instruction and training, and the afternoons devoted to study. As a contemporary has remarked: "There is in all this a breadth of vision and an intelligent patriotism quite characteristic of General Wood. It is worthy of him at his best and that is saying a good deal."

Tardily the Government awakened to an appreciation of the people's resentment over the treatment of General Wood. He was called to Washington and the Distinguished Service Medal was pinned upon his breast by the Secretary of War. He was now transferred to the command of the Central Department of the Army with headquarters at Chicago, one of many transfers made under President Wilson's Administration, but the only one which was not in the nature of a demotion and punishment.

The real reward of this sturdy type of Christian soldier lies in a clear conscience. Responsibility for the hundreds of thousands of brave lives that were sacrificed on the battlefields of Europe because his solemn warnings, so insistently sounded, failed to galvanize the Government into action, does not lie with him. If, under this fearful handicap, the General did indeed fail in his attempt to prevent the breakdown of the War Department when the storm had broken, he at least had a very large part in the responsibility for the splendid record of the American doughboy at the front

—America's one great feat in the war—the one fact that makes every true American swell with pride at the mere thought of it.

The private soldier is no better and no worse than the officers with whom he comes into direct contact, his own company officers. No matter how good the material in the ranks may be, it is largely wasted under incompetent officers. In the American Expeditionary Force the company officers were with few exceptions well trained, and it has been the puzzle of European army staffs how this result was accomplished when no officers' reserve of consequence existed in our army at the outbreak of the war.

The answer to this puzzle is found in the Plattsburg camps, through which passed during the four years in which they were in operation more than 20,000 men, hand-picked and of the right type, and at least 15,000 of them received commissions to form the nucleus of the 80,000 new officers who had military instruction. When war was declared, this system had been tried out and was in suc-

cessful operation, so that it was taken over at once. Of the 150,000 applications received to enter the officers' training camps, 40,000 were chosen, and in forty days they were ready to begin their work. The Plattsburg men were largely included in this 40,000, and they constituted the absolutely necessary nucleus of instructed men to serve as non-commissioned officers, for the lack of which long and vexatious delays must occur. The geometrical progression formed by the numbers who attended the Plattsburg camps during the years 1913 to 1917 is as follows: 1913, 222; 1914, 667; 1915, 3406; 1916, 16,137; 1917 (1st camp), 40,000. No other comment seems necessary.

There was of necessity the sharpest contrast between company officers of the A. E. F. and the officers of higher command who had been jumped to positions which were far outside their experience and of which they knew next to nothing. This was a result of unpreparedness which did not, however, reflect upon them. A story which was current in France relates to a distinguished colonel on the French

General Staff to whom was put the typical American question, "What do you think of the American Army?" Now the Frenchman is diplomatic, but his vision is remarkably clear, and after some futile squirming in the hope of avoiding direct answer, the colonel replied, "There is no better army in Europe from the captains down."

For having so unique a responsibility in the success of the American doughboy in the war, and at the sacrifice of his personal fortunes having forced the Government to action, if not indeed in time to prevent terrible sacrifices, at least in time to prevent the downfall of civilization, General Wood's reward, like that of the Father of his Country, is in the heart of his country. He will increasingly be made aware that there is a wholesome appreciation of what his service has been, and if this should induce that wisdom which springs from experience and lays hold of its bitter lesson to make preparation for the future, Leonard Wood, we may feel sure, will ask no other reward. Furthermore, his name will always be linked with that of Roosevelt

because he possesses the robust and sterling qualities which drew the two men together and made Leonard Wood the man of all others whom Roosevelt admired and loved.

Like his late friend, Roosevelt, Leonard Wood loves his home life and is greatly devoted to his family. In his autobiography, Roosevelt tells us how, when they were together in the national capital, Wood and he took the children of both families for frequent rambles in Rock Creek Park lying to the north of the city; and it has been proposed to erect the great Roosevelt memorial on the crest of the hill in this park.

While engaged in administrative work in Cuba or in military duties in the Philippine Islands, Mrs. Wood has accompanied her husband, for she is accustomed to the hardships of an active army officer's life and is, moreover, much interested in outdoor sports and exercises, especially horseback riding and sailing. Her people came from the vicinity of Morristown, N. J., though she was educated in Washington and lived there for much of the time before her marriage.

Her daughter, Louise Barbara Wood, who is just completing her education, has like her mother been engaged in Red Cross work and is planning to go to France to take part in the important reconstruction work there. The Woods are Episcopalians.

Mrs. Wood has done an immense amount of charitable and Red Cross work among the poor, and for a period of two years before the war she was at the head of a large women's Red Cross organization in New York City. Ever since, wherever she has been, she has kept up her active Red Cross work, and she has associated herself with the work of the Young Women's Christian Association and other women's organizations. She is now the Honorary President of the Women's Roosevelt Memorial Association.

General Wood has two sons and a daughter. Both his sons responded promptly to their country's call and were in service during the war. Leonard Wood, Jr., went to the Officers' Training Camp at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., and came out as a First Lieutenant. He was assigned to the 81st Division at Camp Jackson,

South Carolina. He went overseas with this division, was later promoted to captain, and became the Assistant Intelligence Officer of the division for practically the remainder of the war. He returned to this country in July, 1919, was discharged, and is now engaged in the oil business in Texas. The younger son, Osborne C. Wood, left Harvard University, where he was a student, in March, 1918. Though he was still under age, he enlisted as a private in the Regular Army. He was later transferred to the 355th Infantry 89th Division, from which organization he went to a training camp. He was graduated as Second Lieutenant in August, 1918, and on becoming of age on the 20th of September he was commissioned with that rank. He was assigned to the 164th Depot Brigade at Fort Funston, Kansas, and a little later was appointed Aide-de-Camp to the General, in which capacity he has served since. August 23, 1919, he was promoted to First Lieutenant.

ADDENDUM

THE RESTORER OF LAW AND ORDER

EVERY great and exhaustive war in the course of human history has been followed by an interval characterized by an abnormal and extremely dangerous condition of the body politic. The mass psychology of these periods may be described as that of national shell-shock, to borrow a phrase which the war has given us. The several dominating symptoms of this nervous disorder of the state are all well defined and invariably present, but collectively they may be described as a fixed obsession that the foundations of the political, social, industrial, and intellectual life of the world are in a state of flux, and that those things which have been our reliance in the past are all to be replaced by a new and superior order. The millennium is envisioned as heaven is brought down to earth.

¹ January, 1920.

These epochs of pseudo-idealism are ushered in by such an eruption of emotions that the seat of reason seems likely to become unhinged, and from this distemper no social class is altogether exempt, though the proletariat and the most highly intellectual stratum have always been by far the most susceptible. At the bottom of the social scale, the mob spirit is easily invoked by radicals seeking to set up an autocracy based on false and shallow but most alluring Utopian ideals—ideals which are largely supplied by generally well-meaning but most unpractical representatives of the *intelligenza*. Roused to a state of incipient insanity by the teachings of these leaders, the mob tears at the very foundations of the state. The fundamental right of property is denied, and government by threat and intimidation is attempted. In the higher strata of society, there is an alarming recrudescence of the occult, which is greatly stimulated by the loss of kinsmen in battle. No illusion is too preposterous to find converts, and if stimulated by powerful propaganda, such illusions constitute a serious menace to the state.

These post-war periods call for a steady hand as do no others.

The symptoms of national and international shell-shock have been much more marked and far reaching in the present period only because the war itself has been so much greater and more nearly world wide in its effects. Starting in Russia, the country in which the war losses and the sufferings of the people resulting from it have been most stupendous, the disease has spread eastward into Siberia and westward across Europe to America; the resistance to its invasion being determined both by the degree of exhaustion and war weariness within each state and by the former measure of vigor of the body politic.

In our own country the first more serious outbreaks of after-war insanity appeared as race riots accompanied by indiscriminate shooting, lynching, and arson. The riots of east St. Louis were soon followed by similar eruptions in Knoxville, Washington, and Chicago. Many people were shot in street battles and the infection seemed to be spreading with dangerous rapidity throughout the country.

Late in September, these outbreaks of lawlessness seemed to be reaching a climax at Omaha, where the court-house and the jail were burned by a mob of citizens and where the sixty-year-old mayor was seized by the mob and strung up to a telegraph pole because in discharge of his duty he had refused to deliver up a negro prisoner. Cut down before life became extinct, he was hauled up a second time to be again rescued. Rendered unconscious, for hours his life hung in the balance, but he finally recovered. The mayor thus put out of the way, the negro prisoner was delivered over to the mob by his fellow prisoners when they were placed in danger of being roasted alive by the burning of the jail. He was promptly hanged and his body was trailed behind an automobile through the streets to the wild delight of a mob of normally respectable citizens. Nothing approaching these disgraceful proceedings had ever occurred in an American city. Everything was done openly and was apparently approved by the greater portion of the citizens of Omaha. Clerks and even "lady" stenographers were,

according to the correspondent of the New York *Times*, openly boasting of their part in the proceedings, including the murder of the negro and the attempted murder of the mayor.

Upon this scene of disorder and violence, came federal troops hastily summoned under the command of General Wood who was in charge of the Central Department of the Army with headquarters at Chicago. Machine guns were posted at strategic points and the streets patrolled by squads of soldiers. A military balloon was sent up and swayed back and forth over the city to give immediate warning of the outbreak of fires or of attempts at disorder. This was, however, not all. The seat of the entire trouble was removed when measures were taken to apprehend all persons who had taken part in the murder and to bring them to justice by turning them over to the civil authorities for legal prosecution. General Wood issued the following proclamation:

As a result of the recent serious defiance of law and of the constituted authorities of the

City of Omaha, the Governor of Nebraska has called upon the President of the United States for federal aid in the maintenance of law and order, and the undersigned has been duly charged by the Secretary of War, acting under competent authority, with the preservation of order and the safeguarding of life and property in the City of Omaha. To this end, such instructions as may become necessary will, from time to time, be issued. All persons within the limits of the City of Omaha will obey such instructions as may be issued and will co-operate to the fullest extent in carrying out the same.

Those persons who had been proudly boasting of their part in the disgraceful proceedings now became frightened and spared no effort to make themselves as inconspicuous as possible or else to slip away from the city. Normal conditions were quickly restored and the race riots of our American cities seemed to have come to an end. Law and order had not alone been re-established in one sorely threatened

community, but the seat of the trouble had been located and the remedy found.

Hardly had the troubles at Omaha been settled, when the great steel strike drew the nation's attention to the industrial center at Gary near the city of Chicago. The month of September had been characterized by a veritable epidemic of strikes in one trade after another until the paralysis of all the nation's industry was threatened.

On October 4th an alarming situation developed at Gary, the center of a steel producing district in which 80,000 men had struck, where the blast furnaces of the steel company's plant were damaged by the strikers to the extent of a million dollars, and where the output of necessary steel products was reduced by no less than 2,000,000 tons. On October 6th federal aid was invoked, and after disturbances in which a mob of 15,000 rioters had charged the police with bricks and stones, General Wood took charge of the situation. A body of 1000 overseas veterans of the 4th Division was rushed to Gary armed with rifles, artillery, and machine guns, and other soldiers from the

6th Division later joined them. Guns were mounted in parks and other strategic points and directed down the principal thoroughfares. Many of the strikers had appeared in the uniform of the United States Army, and acting under orders of General Wood, Colonel Mapes required these men to show their discharge papers. If they insisted on wearing their uniform they were set to work to maintain order; otherwise they were required to remove their uniform and were dismissed with a warning. They became an important aid in maintaining order.

No attempt whatever was made to interfere in the quarrel between the strikers and the operators, and picketing by strikers was permitted. Law and order were however insisted upon and no violence permitted.

The following proclamation was issued:

PROCLAMATION

GARY, INDIANA,
October 6, 1919.

1. The Governor of the State of Indiana, having called upon the Department Com-

mander for Federal Troops, for the protection of life and property and the maintenance of public order, the State and City authorities being unable to protect and maintain the same, the Commanding General, Central Department, acting under instructions and authority of the War Department, has assumed control of the City of Gary, Indiana, which until further orders, is under Military Control.

2. It is the purpose of the Military Authorities to conduct the affairs of the City of Gary, to the greatest extent possible, through the City Government, which becomes for the time being an agency of the Military Authorities.

3. The following notice is given to all persons within the limits of the City of Gary:

- (a) No public assemblages or meetings will be permitted in any park, street, or portion of the City.
- (b) All processions and parades are prohibited, as are demonstrations against the authorities.

- (c) No persons other than the police, Military Authorities, troops, and members of the City Government will be allowed to carry arms or weapons of any description.
- (d) All men in the uniform of the United States, whether in the service of the United States or otherwise, who are not a part of the United States armed forces on duty within the City limits, will be examined and those who are still in the service of the United States will be attached to any organization on duty in the City and continued on duty during the present disturbance. All others in United States uniform (not in the service of the United States) will be held until further investigation.
- (e) All men deputized as police who are wearing any portion of

the distinctive uniform of the United States will wear their special badge on the left breast.

- (f) The troops and the police, including special police deputies, are charged with the carrying out of these instructions which will be rigidly enforced.

4. Theatres, Lecture Halls, Moving Picture Shows, and other well conducted places of amusement will continue as usual.

5. All persons within the City limits are admonished to observe and carefully and rigidly comply with the above instructions.

6. Any person or persons having any petition to present or complaint to make will present the same to the commanding officer for his consideration and action.

LEONARD WOOD,
Major-General, U. S. Army.

The support of both parties to the strike was obtained by this course. It soon developed

that the strikes were being directed by alien "reds," and, acting with the agents of the Department of Justice, a vigorous search was instituted and the "red" headquarters raided. October 14th a plot was unearthed to destroy government property and to initiate a general uprising of steel workers headed by "red" agitators which was to cover all the territory from Colorado to West Virginia. Connection was traced between the activities of the Gary "reds" and the bomb outrages which had been directed against the lives of Attorney-General Palmer, Judge Charles C. Nott, and others, in the months of May and June. These revelations greatly cleared up the situation by showing up the radical leadership of the disturbances. On October 24th, at the end of the fifth week, the strike was practically over.

In November serious disturbances occurred in the coal mining districts of West Virginia and large forces of armed miners were marching from one district into another. Governor Cornwell called upon General Wood for assistance, and without delay about 1200 troops of

the 1st Division were sent into the district and all hostile movements ceased and much bloodshed was avoided.

Later on, during the coal strike, which was a strike aimed against the public, the poor as well as the rich, the Governor of Kansas, interested in the necessity of securing coal for hospitals and other places, decided to undertake mining operations with volunteers. After conference with General Wood, the latter agreed to establish an encampment for regular troops in the mining district so that in case of need the protection of life and property would be insured.

During the employment of troops, both in West Virginia and Kansas, the best of relations existed between the people, the working groups, and the troops and no one was injured. Order was preserved and life and property were safeguarded.

Firmness, combined with tact and fairness, had relieved an alarming situation without the loss of a life or the firing of a shot, and the faith of the nation's citizenry in the stability of the foundations of the state had been

enormously increased. For the period of hysteria through which we are now passing, the constant watchword of General Wood is "steady."

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